East Africa in 2050: Nations will die, new
borders will emerge
20 December, 2011 (By CHARLES ONYANGO-OBBO)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The wider East African region is special – and even notorious – in
Africa. In the past 18 years it has produced more new or wanna-
be-new nations than all of Africa combined. In 1993 Ethiopia and
Eritrea agreed a mutual and happy divorce. The good vibes didn’t
last; they became bitter enemies and fought after it happened.
be independent.
In February this year, South Sudan voted by nearly 100 per cent to
secede from Sudan, and in July formally became Africa’s newest
country. That is four major border remakes in less than 20 years.
How many new countries have arisen in the rest of Africa as a
result of a break-up of existing countries (Saharawi Republic doesn’
t count)? ZERO!! Precisely because secessionist and breakaway
demons roam the wider East Africa, the feeling is that over the next
20 to 50 years, we shall see more nations breaking up or being
swallowed as others grow.
For anyone interested in the future borders of what is sometimes
called the Greater Horn of Eastern Africa (GHEA) – comprising
Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda,
Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and DR Congo – two studies are
recommended. The first is a popular piece of work “Fluid Borders:
Integration, Federation, and Fragmentation”, by the Society for
International Development (SID) which was published in its journal
Greater Horn of Eastern Africa Outlook (November 2010).
The second was by one of Africa’s leading border experts, Wafula
Okumu, who now works with the African Union’s Border
Programme. His “Resources and borders disputes in Eastern
Africa”, published in the July 2010 issue of the Journal of Eastern
African Studies is a fascinating look at how Africa’s borders were
made. Okumu argues that contrary to the dominant view, not all
colonial borders were arbitrarily drawn. There was a lot of logic to
the madness. Colonial powers, according to Okumu, drew borders
on the basis of some cold logic; to secure known mineral wealth,
and to control rivers and lakes – one reason why natural features
became border makers.
Secondly, he argues, after the British were routed in the Second
Anglo-Boer war, they studied the reasons for their defeat and
reached the kind of conclusion African generals and politicians
wouldn’t – they lost because of the poor quality and lack of
detailed maps for the British military. They formed the Colonial
Survey Committee to draw up maps of Africa – and the exercise
was largely done by the military. “To the military, a map of features
could be more important than a detailed and accurate demarcation
of a boundary,” he writes. But one of the most eye-popping gems
in the articles, is the citation that, “For all of Africa, only 200,000
square miles of territory had been surveyed in detail by 1914, when
some 3.8 million square miles remained unexplored by Europeans.”
I’ll dwell on two of the many implications that can be drawn from
this. First, because the focus of colonial borders was more on
dividing up mineral and natural resources, it can be expected that
future border conflicts in Africa – as both the GHEA Outlook and
Okumu note – will come from disputes over resources. Secondly,
because most African borders were based on a military and
resource logic, not much social engineering went into them. We can
confidently predict, therefore, that a future cultural remake of our
borders is inevitable.
There is, for example, talk among Luo revivalist nationalists in
northern Uganda, northeast DR Congo, South Sudan (and indeed
Kenya) of the re-creation of a greater Lado Republic (in 1912 the
Lado Enclave stretched from Sudan to a large part of northern
Uganda). This would see bits of northern and northeastern Uganda
and South Sudan forming a big Luo nation.
In Rwanda during the war that eventually ended after the 1994
genocide, in which over one million people were killed, at one point
there were Tutsi hardline purists in the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front
who were pushing for a “two-state” solution; a Tutsi one in the east,
where they would never have to endure torment by the majority
Hutu, and a Hutu one in the rest of the country. The idea was
eventually discredited. In Kenya, apart from the Somali
secessionists in the northeast, in more recent times a secessionist
movement has emerged in the Coast. This would be a kind of
Swahili-Arab East African Republic that, according to some of its
militant advocates, would include Zanzibar Island – which would
swim away from mainland Tanzania.
There was a time when Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni was
wont to talk about an East and Central African mega state built on
the basis of “Bantu commonality”.
One country that must be lucky to still be in one piece is DR
Congo. Ten years ago there was a real fear that the vast and rich,
but thinly and badly governed country, would be carved up into at
least three. One, to the southeast, would be a Rwanda dominion,
probably controlled by the Banyamulenge. The other to the east
would be run by a Ugandan puppet regime. And the West would
be left to the dominant Kinshasa elite.
On the other hand, closer home, Tanzania is thought by some
observers to have become “too big” for the ruling Chama cha
Mapinduzi (CCM) to manage – or that the country can be
managed easily, but CCM has become too unimaginative for the
task. And that as its hold on power slips in the year to come,
Tanzania could be vulnerable. All these and more scenarios could
still come true. However, the exact forces that could determine this
are likely to play out from what we can foresee today.
We think borders are likely to be remade out of a dire need to
survive. Countries threatened with extinction because they have run
out of water or energy, will have little choice but to attack those
that have a lot of it – and secure future supplies through conquest.
The GHEA Outlook and Okumu did not, for understandable
reasons, examine what countries that achieve technological
superiority might do to turn it to their advantage. Some GHEA
countries might fail as states, while others will succeed as powerful
democracies, redistributing power and conferring the ability to
redraw borders on the successful ones. Within the next 30 to 50
years, East Africa borders could be very different.
*Additional reporting and research by Christine Mungai.
Charles Onyango-Obbo is Nation Media Group’s executive
editor for Africa & Digital Media. E-mail: cobbo@ke.
nationmedia.com
. Courtesy
borders will emerge
20 December, 2011 (By CHARLES ONYANGO-OBBO)
-------------------------------------------------------------------
The wider East African region is special – and even notorious – in
Africa. In the past 18 years it has produced more new or wanna-
be-new nations than all of Africa combined. In 1993 Ethiopia and
Eritrea agreed a mutual and happy divorce. The good vibes didn’t
last; they became bitter enemies and fought after it happened.
- In 1991, after the
Siad Barre regime
was overthrown,
Somalia plunged into
chaos. A few years
later Puntland hived
itself off as a semi-
independent nation.
Somaliland too
jumped ship. Unlike
Puntland, which is
open to joining a
future, peaceful
be independent.
In February this year, South Sudan voted by nearly 100 per cent to
secede from Sudan, and in July formally became Africa’s newest
country. That is four major border remakes in less than 20 years.
How many new countries have arisen in the rest of Africa as a
result of a break-up of existing countries (Saharawi Republic doesn’
t count)? ZERO!! Precisely because secessionist and breakaway
demons roam the wider East Africa, the feeling is that over the next
20 to 50 years, we shall see more nations breaking up or being
swallowed as others grow.
For anyone interested in the future borders of what is sometimes
called the Greater Horn of Eastern Africa (GHEA) – comprising
Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda,
Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and DR Congo – two studies are
recommended. The first is a popular piece of work “Fluid Borders:
Integration, Federation, and Fragmentation”, by the Society for
International Development (SID) which was published in its journal
Greater Horn of Eastern Africa Outlook (November 2010).
The second was by one of Africa’s leading border experts, Wafula
Okumu, who now works with the African Union’s Border
Programme. His “Resources and borders disputes in Eastern
Africa”, published in the July 2010 issue of the Journal of Eastern
African Studies is a fascinating look at how Africa’s borders were
made. Okumu argues that contrary to the dominant view, not all
colonial borders were arbitrarily drawn. There was a lot of logic to
the madness. Colonial powers, according to Okumu, drew borders
on the basis of some cold logic; to secure known mineral wealth,
and to control rivers and lakes – one reason why natural features
became border makers.
Secondly, he argues, after the British were routed in the Second
Anglo-Boer war, they studied the reasons for their defeat and
reached the kind of conclusion African generals and politicians
wouldn’t – they lost because of the poor quality and lack of
detailed maps for the British military. They formed the Colonial
Survey Committee to draw up maps of Africa – and the exercise
was largely done by the military. “To the military, a map of features
could be more important than a detailed and accurate demarcation
of a boundary,” he writes. But one of the most eye-popping gems
in the articles, is the citation that, “For all of Africa, only 200,000
square miles of territory had been surveyed in detail by 1914, when
some 3.8 million square miles remained unexplored by Europeans.”
I’ll dwell on two of the many implications that can be drawn from
this. First, because the focus of colonial borders was more on
dividing up mineral and natural resources, it can be expected that
future border conflicts in Africa – as both the GHEA Outlook and
Okumu note – will come from disputes over resources. Secondly,
because most African borders were based on a military and
resource logic, not much social engineering went into them. We can
confidently predict, therefore, that a future cultural remake of our
borders is inevitable.
There is, for example, talk among Luo revivalist nationalists in
northern Uganda, northeast DR Congo, South Sudan (and indeed
Kenya) of the re-creation of a greater Lado Republic (in 1912 the
Lado Enclave stretched from Sudan to a large part of northern
Uganda). This would see bits of northern and northeastern Uganda
and South Sudan forming a big Luo nation.
In Rwanda during the war that eventually ended after the 1994
genocide, in which over one million people were killed, at one point
there were Tutsi hardline purists in the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front
who were pushing for a “two-state” solution; a Tutsi one in the east,
where they would never have to endure torment by the majority
Hutu, and a Hutu one in the rest of the country. The idea was
eventually discredited. In Kenya, apart from the Somali
secessionists in the northeast, in more recent times a secessionist
movement has emerged in the Coast. This would be a kind of
Swahili-Arab East African Republic that, according to some of its
militant advocates, would include Zanzibar Island – which would
swim away from mainland Tanzania.
There was a time when Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni was
wont to talk about an East and Central African mega state built on
the basis of “Bantu commonality”.
One country that must be lucky to still be in one piece is DR
Congo. Ten years ago there was a real fear that the vast and rich,
but thinly and badly governed country, would be carved up into at
least three. One, to the southeast, would be a Rwanda dominion,
probably controlled by the Banyamulenge. The other to the east
would be run by a Ugandan puppet regime. And the West would
be left to the dominant Kinshasa elite.
On the other hand, closer home, Tanzania is thought by some
observers to have become “too big” for the ruling Chama cha
Mapinduzi (CCM) to manage – or that the country can be
managed easily, but CCM has become too unimaginative for the
task. And that as its hold on power slips in the year to come,
Tanzania could be vulnerable. All these and more scenarios could
still come true. However, the exact forces that could determine this
are likely to play out from what we can foresee today.
We think borders are likely to be remade out of a dire need to
survive. Countries threatened with extinction because they have run
out of water or energy, will have little choice but to attack those
that have a lot of it – and secure future supplies through conquest.
The GHEA Outlook and Okumu did not, for understandable
reasons, examine what countries that achieve technological
superiority might do to turn it to their advantage. Some GHEA
countries might fail as states, while others will succeed as powerful
democracies, redistributing power and conferring the ability to
redraw borders on the successful ones. Within the next 30 to 50
years, East Africa borders could be very different.
*Additional reporting and research by Christine Mungai.
Charles Onyango-Obbo is Nation Media Group’s executive
editor for Africa & Digital Media. E-mail: cobbo@ke.
nationmedia.com
. Courtesy
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