Eritrean Independence:
Is It Worth All the Sacrifice? (2)
16 July, 2009 | by Yosief Ghebrehiwet
the problem and not enough on the solution. Let me provide a simple
metaphor that shows what is it that I am trying to do before I delve into
the subject matter alluded in the title of this posting.
half a mile or so from the beach. The lady of the house explained to me
the engineering of the house – specifically, on how its foundation was
built. You see, the house was built on unstable ground because the ocean
water was able to sip into the soil upon which it had been built. But that
doesn’t mean the house is less secure than any other house built on solid
ground (given that this is an earthquake area). It is only that it needed a
special engineering mechanism appropriate to the shifting ground beneath
it, as it makes the house move along with it – though undetectable to the
naked eye. The lady, in fact, said that the house actually had wheels at its
base which enabled it to maneuver with the shifting soil underneath it.
Eritrea too is being built on unstable ground. If we do not come up with
an engineering mechanism appropriate to the unstable ground upon which
it is being built, it won’t stand for long. If one uses solid-ground
engineering to build the house mentioned above, we know what the
disastrous result would be the first time earthquake strikes. So is it with
Eritrea. The romanticizing ones who believe that ghedli (the revolution)
was built on justifiable cause or that this nation of ours is being built on
solid ground are actually the ones who are preparing the nation for an
eventual collapse. What we need now is to lay bare the unstable
foundation upon which Eritrea is being built (deconstruct it, if you will) –
that is, if we are ever to come up with an appropriate mechanism
commensurate to the ever-shifting ground upon which it stands.
I know so far that I am talking at metaphorical level. I entreat my readers
to patiently follow me through my coming postings where I will address
the “baring of the foundation”, before any “building up” could be
attempted. Now let me go to the subject matter of this posting – a
response to Saleh Younis, a great proponent of the solid ground upon
which Eritrea is being built; so solid that he believes the only problem the
nation has is that of Isaias.
A culture of denial: diversionary tactics
In my article “Eritrean Independence: Is It Worth All the Sacrifice?” I
asked a simple question: Is the cause worth all the sacrifice? An
appropriate response would, at minimum, require a sober look at the
natures of the cause and the sacrifice. Saleh does neither. When it comes
to the cause, all that he does is repeat his oxymoronic mantra, “liberating
the land” and “getting rid of the Ethiopian occupation”, the one serving as
the other’s reason in circular turns. He doesn’t even make one serious
attempt to come out of this vicious circularity and tell us as to why
liberating the land or getting rid of the “occupation” was found necessary
in the first place. And whenever hard questions regarding the nature of the
cause that promise to break this circularity arise, he sees a distinction
where there is none and fails (or refuses) to see a distinction where
there is one so as to keep this circular game going. [And when it comes
to the nature of sacrifice, it is one denial after another – but in this
posting, the focus will mainly be on the nature of the cause.] Let me start
with three elementary distinctions regarding the nature of the “cause” that
he refuses to see before we go to the major one: regarding the founding
fathers’ master argument for independence. After that, we will see how
Saleh fantastically comes up with a desperate distinction – splitting Isaias
into two – where none is needed just to vindicate ghedli.
Again, I am using Saleh as a foil to address important issues regarding the
nature of the Eritrean struggle for independence, for he has this
propensity to gravitate around the central issues symptomatic of the
nationalist ailment that afflicts the larger Eritrean society. The level of
denial on the Eritrean public side is so high that they would do anything to
avoid confronting the uncomfortable question raised above, and Saleh
happens to be an embodiment of that culture of denial.
(a) External vs internal justification
If a lady, in a litigation that she wins against her neighbor, sacrifices her
marriage in the process, it is legitimate to ask whether the “winning” is
justifiable given the magnitude of the loss. In this case, her action is being
questioned not because she is not justified to take the man to the court but
because, in the process of doing so, she is not justified in doing what she
has done to herself and her family. Even though her act is justifiable in the
court of law (external justification), that very same act is not justifiable in
the eyes of her family (internal justification). And it is important to
remember that when the family raises the question of justification, it has
already factored in whatever benefits it has received from the court
victory.
Why does Eritrea deserve to be an independent state? The rhetorical
answer that most Eritreans love to give is: if every other African nation
that has been previously colonized has gotten its independence, then why
shouldn’t it be so in the case of Eritrea? This rhetorical answer is, I
believe, sufficient as responses go; but only if given as a response to an
outsider’s query. It is a legal or technical argument that one provides, for
instance, at the AU or UN. But we owe it to ourselves – as insiders – that
we come up with a totally different reason as to why we want a different
nation when we are addressing the question to one another. Among other
factors, the questions of identity, sacrifice, cohabitation and sustainability
become of paramount importance in this kind of internal justification: Is
there such a thing as Eritrean identity? Is the cause worth the all sacrifice?
Is the nation created out of this sacrifice sustainable? Can we – Moslems
and Christians – live together to create a free, democratic and prosperous
Eritrea that would make it in postmodern 21st century?
Saleh is a prime example of those Eritreans who confuse external
justification for internal one. When responding to the question why the
armed struggle started, all he says is that the Ethiopians didn’t keep their
word; that they unilaterally abrogated the federation treaty, and so on. And
as responses go, this might be a sufficient answer when given to an
outsider (as in the example given above). His response is equivalent to
saying that Ethiopians deserve the armed struggle because they started it.
But the internal justification has to do with an entirely different question:
do the Eritrean people deserve the armed struggle? He misses the
whole point because it is not what we did to them with the armed struggle
that is at issue but what we did to ourselves. It is also important to
remember that when we ask such a question, it is always after having
factored in whatever Ethiopia did to us – be it in treaties it abrogated or in
atrocities it committed – and the “victory” that came out of the struggle.
And if, in the end, we find out that ghedli has had no justifiable cause at
all, then the loss would go beyond the question of proportions; for there
would be no worthy cause at all with which to compare the sacrifice and
hence becomes prohibitive and inexcusable.
(b) Economic vs identity sustainability
Saleh has this tendency to line up many of the failed states of Africa to
justify the economic viability of Eritrea. Leaving aside the fact that he sets
his bar too low, the issue of sustainability, as framed in my last article,
has nothing to do with economic viability. I have always believed that
those who argue that the nation doesn’t deserve independence because it
is economically unsustainable are wrong. If its economy is to be an issue,
it would only be so if, prior to such a failure, the state has already failed at
a deeper level – at cohabitation level, where identity becomes a primary
issue.
The issue of sustainability that I raised has to do with the great divide that
exists between Muslim and Christian Eritrea – a divide that has been so
recalcitrant that it has out-survived the British, Ethiopian and ghedli eras,
and now is set to out-survive the Isaias regime. And what is more, given
the divisive tactics of the Isaias regime and the radicalization of Islam in
the region, the gap has even gotten wider than at any time before in the
short history of this nation. In the process, these two population groups
have come to embrace two diametrically opposed visions of where the
nation should be heading to that it is very hard (if not impossible) to
reconcile. As the one looks to Islam and the Arab world for guidance,
inspiration, association and identity, the other looks to the West and
Habesha world. These visions are so conflicting with one another that it is
impossible to accommodate them without the one displacing the other.
Therefore, this divide, in its potentiality, is even deeper and more
recalcitrant than the divide that used to exist between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
If the Eritrean nation eventually fails to sustain itself, it will be because of
this ever-widening, potentially irreconcilable identity divide.
This problem goes at the root of Eritrean identity. The linchpin that
supposedly holds these two population groups is the Eritrean identity. But
put under scrutiny, no such univocal identity exists. Whenever they talk
about “Eritrea”, the two population groups have two different Eritreas in
mind. A national identity cannot be built on a grammatical
confluence only, where an acoustic or script (or graphic – as in a
map) confluence hides semantic ambiguity. At these moments, neither
the ear nor the eyes are to be trusted; instead, we have to use our head to
disambiguate things – something that has been lacking throughout the
revolutionary movement. [Sometimes I honestly believe that the whole
Eritrean question is based on a grammatical confusion.]
Saleh pretends that this problem doesn’t exist and, instead, attempts to
answer an easier question entirely made up in his own mind. Again, his
response is symptomatic of larger Eritrea, which does all it can to wish
the problem away rather than tackle it head on – to whatever logical end
that may take us.
(c) Determinate vs indeterminate qualities
Saleh, in his article “The Spark, the Fire and the Torch”, mentions seven
“virtues” or “qualities” that supposedly made the Eritrean revolution
unique in Africa – such as “it was purpose-driven”, “it prevailed”, “it was
fought according to conventions of war”, “it was not someone else’s
proxy war”, etc. You could clearly see his fascination as to HOW ghedli
was conducted, without bothering to tell us as to WHY it was needed in
the first place. In his last response, he laments that I unnecessarily visited
these issues twice. He could not understand that I was addressing them
from their indeterminate and determinate sides.
The reason why I was addressing these “virtues” twice was because I
was making two points that could only be dealt consecutively. First, I
was emphasizing that, absent a clear identification of ghedli’s justifiable
cause, these “virtues” are indeterminate in nature; that is, standing on their
own, nobody could tell whether they are desirable or not. The example I
gave was meant to elucidate on this phenomenon: just by looking at a man
running fast, nobody can determine what the man is doing as good or
bad, even as one admires the runner’s skill. One needs to know why he is
running prior to making a judgment on the nature of that “running”. And
second, I was making the point that even if we assume that ghedli had a
justifiable cause – for the sake of argument – thereby providing content
to the otherwise neutral “virtues”, it lacked the so-called qualities that
Saleh attributes to it. Unlike the former, the latter required a detailed look
at ghedli’s past.
Again, Saleh’s malady is symptomatic of the larger society’s ailment: the
public has always been fascinated by HOW (the process) ghedli was
conducted – the heroism, the selflessness, the victories, martyrdom, the
women warriors, self-reliance, the patriotic songs, biddho, tsin’at,
tewefayinet, bitsifrna, temokro mieda, etc – without having any clue as to
WHY (the goal) it was needed in the first place and where it was heading.
The masses were fascinated by ghedli’s running skill, only to find
out in the end that all along it had been running empty handed (as
in a fool’s errand) and that in its “victory” it had nothing to offer
them.
Now let me address the most important distinction that Saleh (and most
Eritreans) fail or refuse to see because it strikes at the core of the cause
for independence.
The master argument: reconcilable vs enduring differences
Eventually, Saleh does manage to stumble into the true cause of the
revolution (at least, the half part of it) although remaining totally oblivious
as to the unjustifiable nature of the reasons that he so proudly enumerates
(“De-Romanticizing Ghedli: Serving A Toxic Brew To The Young And
The Disillusioned”):
“First of all, half of Eritrea, the part that supported Andnet, actually
bought that argument. In fact, they didn’t even think they had to
‘struggle’ because, in their mind, Ethiopia was already free and ruled by a
benevolent and divinely-guided king. The other half (Ibrhaim
Sultan/Adulkadir Kebire at the UN and Woldeab Woldemariam in his
writings) argued that Ethiopia was more feudal, more primitive, less
industrialized, less developed, and less democratic than Eritrea and it
would slow down Eritrea’s progress.”
The development argument
Let me reiterate the reasons that the founding fathers of the Eritrean
revolution had for preferring separation from Ethiopia so that there would
be not the slightest bit of doubt in the mind of readers: that Ethiopia was
more feudal, more primitive, less industrialized, less developed, and
less democratic than Eritrea and it would slow down Eritrea’s
progress. If this is true – and I tend to agree with Saleh on this – the
revolution (and the nation it wanted to build) must have been founded on
one of the shallowest causes imaginable (an unstable ground indeed)! Here
is why:
If we are to take the founding fathers’ line of reasoning to its logical end,
then the following happens to be true: if Ethiopia had been less (or
equally) feudal, less (or equally) primitive, more (or equally) industrialized,
more (or equally) developed and more (or equally) democratic than
Eritrea, then the founding fathers would have never argued for separation.
In fact, if we look at Ethiopia now, not only has it caught up with us in
most of these criteria, it has even surpassed us in some. There is
absolutely no doubt that it is more democratic than us – whatever
shortcomings its democracy might have. It is more developed and more
industrialized; and given the pace of its growth, the gap might even get
wider and wider. And as for feudalism, it is something that would
eventually disappear as industrialization, urbanization, education and
development increases, all of which Ethiopia has been doing better than
us. And as for the more subjective criteria of primitivism, given the past
50 years of barbarity and the Khmer Rouge like regime that we have now,
we are the last people on earth to preach anyone on this subject matter.
If the above is true, let’s now push this line of reasoning to its logical
conclusion: had the founding fathers lived to see this day or, better yet,
had they had the foresight that this day would come, they would have
never clamored for independence.
What, indeed, is deadly wrong with the founding fathers’ master
argument? They confused achievable properties for intrinsic ones.
They thought that backwardness was in the nature of Ethiopians and
progress in the nature of Eritreans. But as the passage of time has shown
us, all the differences they mentioned were easily bridgeable
(surmountable, reconcilable, etc), especially since Eritrea was not that
far ahead in all these categories – despite the illusion of it. But more
relevantly, if this was to be seen as a race, both Eritrea and Ethiopia
were a few meters removed from the starting line, in a long journey
that has yet to be finished. That is to say, given the long march of
civilization they had to go through as beginners, the advantage the
Eritreans had and were so proud of was totally insignificant.
We can mention three main reasons why the advantage Eritreans believed
they had over Ethiopians was illusory in the first place: (a) There was no
long history of urbanization in Italian Eritrea. Asmara, as a city, came to
emerge in the last six years of Italian rule. Prior to that, for about 45 years
it had remained a sleepy colonial town. (b) And when it comes to the
urban areas, the natives were confined to the ghettos, performing the
lowest kind of jobs. (c) Unlike the British and French, the Italians didn’t
educate their colonial subjects; the maximum education that a native could
get was a fourth grade. (D) The sudden development growth of Eritrea
depended on Ethiopia – even in colonial era!
We Eritreans seem to totally miss that the Italians built Asmara not
with Eritrea but with Ethiopia in their mind – that it to say, even the
little advantage that we had would have been be inconceivable without
Ethiopia. For a very convincing argument on (d), look at Tekeste Negash’
s excellent article, “The dilemma of Eritrean identity and its future
trajectories”: the paradox that even though Eritreans believed Ethiopia was
holding them back while totally dependent on the Ethiopian market for that
growth is best exemplified in the rapid urbanization of Asmara in the last
six years of Italian rule; it was only when Italy decided to invade Ethiopia
that Asmara was suddenly transformed from a sleepy town to a city of
about 100,000; within those six years it grew seven fold. And in the 50’s
and 60’s, Asmara flourished mainly because of the unfettered access it
had to the Ethiopian market.
And now, the downward spiral that ghedli started (what I called “the
greatest interruption”) is being accelerated under the PFDJ. Yet, many
Eritreans still think they are more advanced. Why? Because they believe
that that civilizing aspect (whatever that is), despite all evidence to the
contrary, is intrinsic to themselves; that is, they don’t have to point at
anything outside themselves to prove that. As all forms of
fundamentalisms go, this too is founded not only on the most trivial
aspect of one’s imagined self but also on fallaciously making an absolute
and immutable “truth” out of it.
The religion argument
But I would like to give more substance to the founding fathers’ motive
for independence than the frivolous one Saleh mentions, especially on the
Muslim side – the other half of the master argument. According to Saleh,
it is the independence bloc that embraced the development argument,
which was overwhelmingly Muslim. [Mohammed Birhan Hagos begs to
differ, who believes that it is the Christians who argued along this fascist
lines.] That would indeed be odd since this group represented that part of
Eritrea that was less educated and less urbanized, and hence in no position
to argue along the line mentioned above. Even when it comes to
feudalism, it was no better than Kebessa or Ethiopia; after all, it was only
during the British occupation that the Shimagle/Tigre feudal structure that
prevailed in the Muslim area, one that bordered to a caste-system, that
came to be dismantled.
That doesn’t mean that the Muslim half of Eritrea didn’t argue along that
line though; it did. Besides believing in it, it latched on to this argument
precisely because it felt it was the only cause that could hold the two
halves together, as weak a link as that might have been. This argument
was eventually appropriated by urban Eritrea (populated mainly by
Christians) and became the basis for the nihilist foundation of Shaebia.
Muslim Eritrea, on the other hand, although still espousing this idea, had a
more potent and overriding reason – an internal justification – to seek for
separation.
On the Muslim side, it was primarily a religious grievance (buttressed by
pan-Arabism) that motivated the independence movement. The names of
the movements themselves say it all: the Muslim League and Rabita Al
Islamia. The main argument of the main players of the Muslim bloc such
as Sheikh Abdulkadir Kebire and Ibrahim Sultan was that they would fare
worse under Ethiopia because it didn’t threat its Muslims right.
Again, if we push this line of reasoning to its logical end, had Ethiopia
been treating its Moslem population fair (“fairness” defined according to
them) or, better yet, had it been an Islamic state, this grievance would
have never been raised, and with it, the question of independence. It is
hard for me to imagine the likes of Ibrahim Sultan and Abdelkadir Kebire
demanding independence under such favorable conditions.
If the above is true, what is paradoxical is that the implication of the
Moslem bloc’s stand was consistent with the Andnet bloc’s stand. If the
Moslem bloc’s fear was that it would not fare better than Christians
(which included Eritrean Christians) under Ethiopian union, then they
ought to have seen no problem with the Andent bloc’s stand, which –
according to them – was set to profit from such a union. This implicit
logical agreement though had to remain inarticulate because the Christians
were needed as partners in the movement for independence.
Ever since, this strategic alliance had come to unravel many times because
of its inherent internal contradictions. Jebha is a good example of an
organization that died as a result of the internal contradiction that these
logical and strategic demands imposed on it. And it this contradiction that
exists now in its most potent form: even though the two population
groups feel they need each other to keep Ethiopia at bay (strategic
alliance), they don’t see eye to eye when it comes to the kind of Eritrea
they want to build. [This has been made stark clear recently with the EDA
split exactly along the old lines of the Muslim-Christian divide.] The
problem is that no nation can be built on strategic alliance only.
From the above, the paradox that emerges as a result of confusing easily
reconcilable differences for irreconcilable ones and enduring differences
for easily reconcilable ones cannot be lost on us: while the founding
fathers (and most Eritreans) thought the development difference was
irreconcilable, they totally ignored the much deeper and more enduring
divide based on identity. To understand the severity of this divide, one has
to look at the layers it is made up of; it is a seven-decked divide that pits
the Muslim against the Christian, the lowlander against the highlander, the
pastoralist against the sedentary farmer, the Tigrigna against other ethnic
groups, Tigrigna against other languages (and Arabic) and the Arab world
against the Habesha world. The seventh layer has to do with the two
groups’ different historical trajectories that only came to meet in the last
century.
It is important to remember that neither the Christians nor the Muslims
were arguing along nationalist lines. No national identity can be built based
on an achievable property like development, and for that matter skin-deep
only. The moment the nation against which they want to define
themselves becomes equally or more developed, that distinguishing
identity evaporates. The second, although based on actual identity, the
nationhood that it demands is based on a strategic alliance that requires an
enemy to hold it together. But once denied of outside enemy, the alliance
collapses; and so does the nation.
Non-nationalist causes
If the two causes that ghedli was fighting for were non-nationalist at the
core, two critical questions that put the necessity of ghedli itself into
question arise:
The fact that both grievances still persist with us in their pernicious forms
after the armed struggle’s “goal” has been achieved (after “mission
accomplished”), and the Eritrean nation was born, tells us that the solution
doesn’t fit the problem.
We have seen that urban Eritrea’s (mainly Christian) development
grievance would have been met within proper Ethiopia. And when it
comes to the Muslim grievance, Saleh Ghadi tells us that under the
current Ethiopian government, the Muslims’ lot has “improved many fold”
(“More of Red Tears”). If he cannot say so in the case of the current
regime in Eritrea, does it mean that Muslim grievances could have been
better met within Ethiopia? For instance, if lowland Eritrea had gotten its
own Kilil (the dream of federalists), would that have done more to address
Muslim grievances than all the 50 years of ghedli insanity? After all, when
Dergh was flirting with such an idea, it was getting a good traction among
the lowlanders. Under such Kilil, most of the intractable problems that
currently haunt Eritrea – the land problem, the settlement problem, the
refugee problem, the language problem, the constitution problem, etc –
would have disappeared. It seems as if a larger breathing space than
claustrophobic Eritrea is needed to address all these issues; after all, there
are certain experiments that only larger nations could easily afford.
In our age, absolutism in its pernicious sense takes place when “truths”
are made out of transitory or trivial phenomena. It is the easiest and laziest
way of coping with the complex realty brought about by modernity.
When Eritreans tried to make an easily achievable attribute
intrinsic to their identity, it was an easy way of coping with the
modern world suddenly thrust upon them with the Italian
encounter. The problem is no such “truths” could be fixed permanently
without drastically altering the very context in which they find themselves
embedded. Instead of the “truths” conforming to reality on the ground,
the world has to be violently altered to fit those fixed “truths”. And it is
amidst this kind of drastic alterations that human tragedies of epic
proportion take place. The current tragedy in Eritrea is a good example
where the whole society had to undergo radical experimentation to fit
ghedli “truths” that Shaebia dragged all the way from Sahel.
The sad truth is that the Shaebia man was created to provide solidity to a
chimera of an Eritrean identity; that is, nationalism had to be imposed after
the fact. Realizing that no enduring identity could be built on easily
achievable properties or on strategic alliances only, it was felt a new
identity that would hold the country together had to be built from scratch
– of course, after demolishing all competing identities. This Frankenstein
creature came to be in order to supersede (and not reconcile) what were
thought to be irreconcilable parts of Eritrea. That is to say, most of the
current ills of the nation could be traced to the independence movement’s
attempt to create a cause ex nihilo, given that there was no prior cause
that justified its creation.
One doesn’t fight to create a national identity; one fights to keep an
identity one already has. The whole Eritrean tragedy comes as result
of reversing this natural order. Eritreans don’t realize that the
unity they have been fighting for is at the root of all their problems.
If there are “unionists” to be blamed for the Eritrean malaise, it
would be these unionists.
[But since Part III will deal with how the crisis in modernity shaped the
Eritrean movement of independence, I won’t explore it further here.]
Splitting Isaias into two
For Saleh, as for many others of his ilk, the only way ghedli could be
vindicated is if all the current ills of Eritrea are to be attributed to one man
only – Isaias. But there is a serious dilemma to be faced in such an
endeavor:
If Isaias is to be blamed for all the ills of the nation, does it mean that
PFDJ is blameless? But that would be absurd; for without the huge
apparatus of the PFDJ, that has it tentacles spread all over Eritrea and
beyond, Isaias wouldn’t survive even a day. But if the ghedli apologists
are to hold both accountable (as Saleh does, in spite of his rhetoric, “It is
only Isaias!”), then another problem arises: if they cannot hold Isaias and
PFDJ separate of one another, how is it possible for them to hold Isaias
and Shaebia separate of one another, since he has been at the helm of
leadership of both organizations since the day of their inception? Even if
Saleh is willing to go as far as attributing all the ills of ghedli to Isaias to
get out of this dilemma, thereby exculpating PFDJ also in the process,
that would be admitting that ghedli was in as much a mess as Eritrea is
now.
So what is to be done? Saleh comes up with an ingenious solution: why
not split Isaias into two, and blame only the Isaias-after-the-border-
crisis! This way ghedli will be vindicated without going to the absurd
length of separating Isaias from the organizations that he has been leading:
the bad-half of Isaias will remain attached to PFDJ and the good-
half of Isaias will remain attached to ghedli! Here then is a case of a
distinction being fabricated where no distinction is called for. How does
he do it?
According to Saleh, all the problems of Eritrea started when Isaias
became paranoid as a result of the border war (“You Might Be a Ghedli
Romantic if …”):
“A step back. Has Isaias always been a tyrant, a dictator of sorts or have
events pushed him in that direction? Is the person who gave his consent
not only to the constraints of constitutionalism but to a constitution which
imposes term limits on his presidency … the same as the one who
unilaterally, and without any formal explanation, postponed elections 7
years ago and is now saying the next elections are in 30-40 years? …
“Why is he so cruel to his own people?
“A couple of theories. Why did the frightened man continue to beat a dead
snake? Because he is terrified of snakes. Similarly, the cruelty that Isaias
shows to his own people can only be due to two reasons: he has lost his
bearings or he has lost his balls.”
Although he won’t dare say it loud and clear, Saleh is telling us that before
the border crisis Isaias was a full-blown democrat at heart, and ready to
implement the constitution. Regarding this, I once wrote (“The Collective
Insanity that is Killing a Nation”):
“… And now, belatedly, the ghedli-apologists have discovered that the
Isaias-before-independence was a democrat at heart and hence not to be
blamed either; for they know, again, they cannot do that without
blemishing ghedli in the process. So who actually is to be blamed for all
the horrors that the nation is undergoing? The seven year old paranoia
of Isaias – when ‘he has lost his bearings or he has lost his balls.’ … And
when he had his bearings and balls all intact? He was all for the
constitution (figure that out!) …”
Of course, Saleh’s magic wand, by which he tries to make all that
implicates ghedli disappear by splitting Isaias into two, is just that – one of
those magic shows where one uses the power of illusion to split a man
into two with a saw, but with the man coming out intact at the end of the
process. [I would rather believe in Mengs’ “The Thing” – it looks more
scientific to me.]
Family resemblances with other movements
Even as he believes that PFDJ too is to be blamed, Saleh still propagates
his “one man theory” for precautionary reasons:
“… It is unthinkable to them that one man of extraordinary skills (talent, if
you are an admirer) like Isaias Afwerki can wreak so much havoc and
destruction in a country of five million. Thus, it is concluded, it can’t be
him; so it must be somebody else---his colleagues, the revolution that
produced him, the society that raised him ...”
We are not talking about a revolution that produced one monster, but a
multitude of monsters, enablers, supporters, cheerleaders and
romanticizers – a whole culture of martyrdom. The fact that someone
comes at the top doesn’t mean that his look-alikes at the bottom have to
be exculpated. But even if we are to look at the relation between the
system and the leadership only, there is too consistent a connection to be
dismissed as coincidence.
It is not a coincidence that nations like the Soviet Union, China, North
Korea, Communist Romania and Khmer Rouge’s Cambodia all invariably
produced totalitarian leaders, and for that, monsters of epic proportion:
Joseph Stalin, Mao Tsetung, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, Pol Pot and
Nicolae Ceausescu respectively. It could only be something in the system
that keeps churning out one tyrant after another. Only a poor observer
would reverse this causal process. That doesn’t mean that the tyrants
were not responsible for much of the horror that took place in their
respective reigns. But to simply attribute all the problems to the leaders
would leave the question as to why such a system keeps invariably
producing such tyrants a riddle. And more importantly, the totalitarian
leader cannot inflict the kind of pain that he invariably does without the
totalitarian machine that such a system produces.
The same holds true with many liberation fronts, especially if they are of
the “ideological” type and have undergone too much violence in their past.
It doesn’t have necessarily to be of a particular ideology so far as it
comes in its “pure” form – be it in its fundamentalist, communist, fascist
or even nihilist sense. To mention three cases – the Taliban, the Khmer
Rouge and the Tamil Tigers. These three movements have done more
horror to their respective populations than what the “enemy” has done. So
is it with many liberation fronts in South America, which started with
leftist aspirations to fight for the downtrodden masses and ended up as
drug cartels. So is it with some African liberation movements, which
underwent similar degeneration. And so is it with Shaebia. As in the case
of the communist states mentioned above, the same question has to be
asked regarding these liberation fronts: what is it about the experience that
these liberation fronts undergo – be it in their ideological or armed struggle
sense – that turns them into monsters? This is especially true if that
violent experience happens to be long, bloody and large scale, as has been
in the case of Eritrea.
That doesn’t mean some liberation fronts should have never started. What
determine a revolution are the clarity and nature of its cause, its periodic
assessment on its sacrifice and progress and the nature and magnitude of
the “evil” that it is fighting against; all of which have been direly lacking in
the case of Eritrea. First, up to this day nobody can tells us the cause that
justifies what the people have gone through in the last 50 years or the
bleak future they face now. Second, given that the armed struggle lasted
for 30 years, there can be no excuse as to why the “liberators” failed to
reassess their mission. Saleh reminds us how the Eritrean people gave
Aman Andom a receptive ear – ready to reassess their stand. What he
forgot to add is that the fronts were dead set against his overtures. They
felt he was a threat to their very existence; predictably, they were more
worried about their existence than the welfare of the masses. And third,
one wonders whether Eritrea did fare worse than other provinces in
Ethiopia, even the Amhara ones – take Gojjam, for instance. Or if a
comparison is needed to gauge the “colonial” nature of Ethiopia, think of
the apartheid system in Zimbabwe and South Africa and the colonial
system in Angola and Mozambique (all of which had liberation
movements).
Family resemblances from within
Recreating the ghedli environment – and with it, the Shaebia man – has
been the obsession not only of Isaias but also of the Yikealo generation.
So all that we have to do is trace every problem that the nation is facing
now to its ghedli past to see the stark family resemblance between the
two. The evidence is so overwhelming and so straightforward that only a
starry eyed romantic like Saleh would miss it. Let me start with one man’
s testimony before I go to national service and other general similarities.
(a) One man’s testimony
A reader who announced himself as someone who was living around
Areza at that time emailed me the following in response to my latest article:
“In the 1980s, the EPLF had taken many underage kids including girls by
force. Many of the kids returned home, some ran to the cities, many went
to Tigray and others crossed the border to the Sudan. When parents were
not able to bring their kids back and hand them to the EPLF, their crops
were confiscated. This was during the worst famine of the 1980s.
Although the yield of the crops was too little due to the lack of rain, the
aim of this inhumane act was to kill the whole family unit by hunger.
Many families had no choice but to migrate to Tigray in search of food
but Tigray was equally a famine-stricken region during that time.”
And this kind of atrocity was not confined to the EPLF, as the following
quotation from the same person testifies:
“… As a child growing up in the vicinity of Areza, Seraye (during Jebha
time) I had seen enough of the cruelty of this organization. When it had
won the war against Kohain, it had confiscated thousands of their
livelihoods cattle and brought many of them to our village. The shepherds
of the village, including myself, had to take turns in looking after them
until they were all slaughtered one by one. When it won the war against
Dembelas, it did the same thing. I had seen the Raya Azebo POWs who
were captured by Jebha in the seventies perish of disease, hunger and the
few lucky ones who had survived were killed in cold blood during the
1978 retreat. I had seen many innocent Eritrean merchants (negado) been
arrested and tortured. I had seen people being hanged in Areza … accused
of spying for the Ethiopian regime without any proof …”
If we are wondering now why is it that parents are being penalized for the
“crimes” committed by their sons and daughters (army desertion or
conscription evasion) either through a hefty penalty of 50,000 Nakfa or
imprisonment; why is it that at the middle of famine peasants are being
confiscated of their harvest; why is it that a huge chunk of the national
service attendants is made up of underage; why is it that the young are
clamoring to get out of the nation; why is it that many are arrested,
tortured and executed with little or no evidence, all that we have to do is
look at one man’s brief testimony of his past encounters with ghedli.
(b) National service: recreating the mieda experience
National service has become the greatest scourge of the land primarily
because it is where Shaebia’s greatest experimentation to turn Eritrea into
Sahel is being conducted. Almost all the ills that afflict the nation can be
traced to this ill-conceived project, among which are bloody
confrontations with neighboring countries, mass exodus, perpetual
slavery, mass starvation, proliferation of prisons, killings and massacres,
parental penalization and sexual abuse of women. And the blue print for
this project comes out directly from ghedli’s past.
But if we are to specifically trace how this family resemblance between
mieda and national service came about, we have to look at its conceptual
beginnings. Incidentally, Saleh, in one of the ugliest moments of his
writing, accuses “The Young and the Disillusioned” – the disillusioned
Warsai – for having failed to appreciate the “virtues” of ghedli because
Shaebia, besides bringing them “liberation” in a silver platter, didn’t
sweeten this package by adding to it their education trust fund. Leaving
aside his arrogance and insensitivity, I like the fact that he couched it in
terms of “inheritance” since that is exactly what their ironically given
name denotes – “Warsai”.
The word “inheritor” triggers a positive connotation as someone who has
inherited a good legacy or material benefits. One wouldn’t call someone
who inherits a debt an inheritor. But the Warsai are meant to inherit the
worst: “the fruits of ghedli” – call them “the grapes of wrath”. Ghedli had
nothing to offer except its hardships, which it was more than willing to
recreate under the slightest pretext. This is what I wrote in “Identity
through ‘Equality by Subtraction’” regarding that Orwellian named
inheritance:
“Let me now couch the above mentioned irony in ‘appealing’ terms: the
Warsai are meant NOT to inherit the fruits of the struggle, but oddly
enough, the struggle itself; or rather all the hardships that the struggle
offers …
“What makes this undertaking [the national service] sinister is that the
Yikealo generation actually believes letting its younger generation go under
the same hardship experiences that they have undergone in the struggle
years is the best legacy they can leave behind. The fact that the CAUSE
that necessitated such a hardship doesn’t exist any more doesn’t bother
the Shaebia generation at all. For them, it is the PROCESS, with its
potential of reshaping the Warsai in the image of Shaebia, and not the
CAUSE, that matters. That is why recreating the ghedli environment,
wherein such an experimentation would be freely and excessively
conducted, became an obsession of this generation. The beginning of this
sinister task was Sawa, one that eventually culminated in the war with
Ethiopia. This war was not only willed into existence by Isaias, it was also
happily embraced by his generation for providing it the perfect context it
had been desperately seeking for to recreate the mieda experience into
which it wanted to initiate a whole new generation. The extended military
service which the Warsai have been subjected to for the last ten years is
not so much a military necessity as it is a conducive environment for this
sinister undertaking. Having triumphantly succeeded in recreating the
struggle era (minus its cause, of course), the Isaias generation can now
proudly point at all the ‘hard experiences’ they have let the Warsai inherit.”
Indeed, the direct family resemblance between ghedli and national service
is to be found in the ugly legacy that the latter is supposed to inherit from
the former – a cause for all the horror in Eritrea. An education trust fund,
my foot!
(c) Other family resemblances
For those who are not yet convinced of the family resemblance between
Shaebia and PFDJ, let me add some major policy similarities to what I
have said so far:
Given the overwhelming evidence that is to be found at the surface level,
it is amazing to see the tenacity with which Saleh keeps repeating his
mantra: It is only Isaias! It is only Isaias!
Demonizing the Warsai generation
Saleh’s fuzzy logic is to be found in every paragraph that he has written.
It would require a book to address them line by line. Before I conclude
this article though, I would like to say a few words on a subject matter
that he is willing to compromise not only his logical but also moral
integrity: the demonizing of the Warsai generation, all for the sake ghedli.
Saleh believes that I have found a receptive audience among the young
and the disillusioned. Well, the first thing that we have to do is figure out
the population group so vulnerable as to be willing to swallow the “toxic
brew” that I keep concocting. I am sure that by this vulnerable young
generation, he doesn’t mean the YPFDG. The latter group are up to their
neck immersed in romanticizing ghedli and hence in tune with Saleh on
this critical point. So who could he be pointing his finger at? Well, the
only ones left are some of the Warsai generation in Diaspora who,
according to him, couldn’t make the distinction between the Isaias regime
and ghedli.
In order to make his point, he has to demonize them first: first, he dubs
them “Y&D”, hoping to categorically stigmatize them; second, he
infantilizes them (“the young”), even though most of this generation are in
their 30’s; third, he makes an unjustifiably disillusioned generation out of
them, ungrateful of the independence someone else brought them with so
much sacrifice; and, fourth, he derogatively labels them (“the Wall
Leaners”, among other insunuations).
But the Warsai is the last population group that ought to be accused of
having a wrong understanding of ghedli and its teghadelti because they
have been living it. Unlike those in Diaspora who are fighting for a
bankrupt idea from a distance, the Warsai have the most intimate
knowledge of what it is like to be under the terror of ghedli [many of
which I have mentioned before]. All the Warsai are asking is to be left
alone to live a normal life, as any other human beings in any part of this
planet would do. To a generation that has been living under unimaginable
horror, to say that they are brats who are disillusioned because Shaebia
didn’t put a trust fund for their education is to reach a height of
insensitivity I have never seen in Saleh before. How is this supposed to be
different from what Isaias has been saying regarding the starving masses:
that they are spoiled?
Is Saleh telling us that the Warsai are leaving their country in droves
because Shaebia didn’t put a trust fund for their education? If so, perhaps
a better comparison would be Ghidewon Abbay, who has been accusing
the Warsai generation of abandoning Eritrea for better life in the West. But
that would be odd, given what Saleh has to say in response to the
involuntary nature of ghedli that I described: “About the Jebha tegadelti
and their decision of what to do after they were pushed out to Sudan, he
leaves out one critical factor in their decision-making process: the
unprecedented generosity of the West and their willingness to accept to
exile any Eritrean who happened to be in Sudan at that time …” As usual,
he doesn’t seem to understand the implications of his statement on the
nature of ghedli. What does it say of those who supposedly chose life
over death but when given alternative suddenly chose America over
Eritrea – that they were fighting for lack of a better alternative in
their personal livelihoods? But if he would believe, like me, that neither
ghedli nor national service had any justifiable cause, then it makes sense to
abandon both of them for a better alternative. Much more so in the case
of Warsai, given the horror of an alternative they had been living under.
Saleh – as many other Eritreans of his ilk do – has developed a huge blind
spot for ghedli and, as a result, could only see what glitters. Even the title
of his article “The Spark, The Fire and the Torch” has all the promise of a
Las Vegas casino – all glitter and no substance. As seen from the above,
the logical flaw is as deep as it could possibly get. In each and every
instance, whether he is ignoring important distinctions or creating one, he
is always fascinated by the technical aspect – be it in the shot that started
it all (the spark); in how (as opposed to why) ghedli was conducted, albeit
falsely; in how the land was liberated, with no idea what to do with that
land once liberated. In all of them, he is reluctant to do some conceptual
digging.
It is painful to see an intelligent guy like Saleh Younis torturing himself,
going not only through logical but also moral contortions, all to vindicate
ghedli. Deep down, I believe that he realizes that if he is going to do what
he has got to do, he has to push logic to the sides. But what it lacks in
logic, he has to make it up somewhere else; hence the character
assassination, the demonizing of the Warsai generation and the naked
pandering to nationalists. To borrow the slogan of the pandered upon, I
want the original Saleh Younis back – one that was witty, intelligent and
honorable.
[I did promise before to post an article on the killings in Eritrea, with a
special emphasis on the Kunama massacre at Mai-Dima, but I have been
postponing it for obvious reasons. Since it is almost done, I will post it
next. After that will follow Part III of “Eritrean Independence: Is It Worth
All the Sacrifice”, where the Muslim-Christian divide, with their defensive
identities, will be explored extensively.]
Yosief Ghebrehiwet
07/16/09
ghyo71@hotmail.com
Is It Worth All the Sacrifice? (2)
16 July, 2009 | by Yosief Ghebrehiwet
- Some readers are
wondering what is it that
I am trying to do with
my latest article, “(I)
Eritrean Independence:
Is It Worth All the
Sacrifice?” Am I trying
to kill the very idea of
“Eritrea”, however
feeble my effort may
be? Not at all! Some of
the problem and not enough on the solution. Let me provide a simple
metaphor that shows what is it that I am trying to do before I delve into
the subject matter alluded in the title of this posting.
half a mile or so from the beach. The lady of the house explained to me
the engineering of the house – specifically, on how its foundation was
built. You see, the house was built on unstable ground because the ocean
water was able to sip into the soil upon which it had been built. But that
doesn’t mean the house is less secure than any other house built on solid
ground (given that this is an earthquake area). It is only that it needed a
special engineering mechanism appropriate to the shifting ground beneath
it, as it makes the house move along with it – though undetectable to the
naked eye. The lady, in fact, said that the house actually had wheels at its
base which enabled it to maneuver with the shifting soil underneath it.
Eritrea too is being built on unstable ground. If we do not come up with
an engineering mechanism appropriate to the unstable ground upon which
it is being built, it won’t stand for long. If one uses solid-ground
engineering to build the house mentioned above, we know what the
disastrous result would be the first time earthquake strikes. So is it with
Eritrea. The romanticizing ones who believe that ghedli (the revolution)
was built on justifiable cause or that this nation of ours is being built on
solid ground are actually the ones who are preparing the nation for an
eventual collapse. What we need now is to lay bare the unstable
foundation upon which Eritrea is being built (deconstruct it, if you will) –
that is, if we are ever to come up with an appropriate mechanism
commensurate to the ever-shifting ground upon which it stands.
I know so far that I am talking at metaphorical level. I entreat my readers
to patiently follow me through my coming postings where I will address
the “baring of the foundation”, before any “building up” could be
attempted. Now let me go to the subject matter of this posting – a
response to Saleh Younis, a great proponent of the solid ground upon
which Eritrea is being built; so solid that he believes the only problem the
nation has is that of Isaias.
A culture of denial: diversionary tactics
In my article “Eritrean Independence: Is It Worth All the Sacrifice?” I
asked a simple question: Is the cause worth all the sacrifice? An
appropriate response would, at minimum, require a sober look at the
natures of the cause and the sacrifice. Saleh does neither. When it comes
to the cause, all that he does is repeat his oxymoronic mantra, “liberating
the land” and “getting rid of the Ethiopian occupation”, the one serving as
the other’s reason in circular turns. He doesn’t even make one serious
attempt to come out of this vicious circularity and tell us as to why
liberating the land or getting rid of the “occupation” was found necessary
in the first place. And whenever hard questions regarding the nature of the
cause that promise to break this circularity arise, he sees a distinction
where there is none and fails (or refuses) to see a distinction where
there is one so as to keep this circular game going. [And when it comes
to the nature of sacrifice, it is one denial after another – but in this
posting, the focus will mainly be on the nature of the cause.] Let me start
with three elementary distinctions regarding the nature of the “cause” that
he refuses to see before we go to the major one: regarding the founding
fathers’ master argument for independence. After that, we will see how
Saleh fantastically comes up with a desperate distinction – splitting Isaias
into two – where none is needed just to vindicate ghedli.
Again, I am using Saleh as a foil to address important issues regarding the
nature of the Eritrean struggle for independence, for he has this
propensity to gravitate around the central issues symptomatic of the
nationalist ailment that afflicts the larger Eritrean society. The level of
denial on the Eritrean public side is so high that they would do anything to
avoid confronting the uncomfortable question raised above, and Saleh
happens to be an embodiment of that culture of denial.
(a) External vs internal justification
If a lady, in a litigation that she wins against her neighbor, sacrifices her
marriage in the process, it is legitimate to ask whether the “winning” is
justifiable given the magnitude of the loss. In this case, her action is being
questioned not because she is not justified to take the man to the court but
because, in the process of doing so, she is not justified in doing what she
has done to herself and her family. Even though her act is justifiable in the
court of law (external justification), that very same act is not justifiable in
the eyes of her family (internal justification). And it is important to
remember that when the family raises the question of justification, it has
already factored in whatever benefits it has received from the court
victory.
Why does Eritrea deserve to be an independent state? The rhetorical
answer that most Eritreans love to give is: if every other African nation
that has been previously colonized has gotten its independence, then why
shouldn’t it be so in the case of Eritrea? This rhetorical answer is, I
believe, sufficient as responses go; but only if given as a response to an
outsider’s query. It is a legal or technical argument that one provides, for
instance, at the AU or UN. But we owe it to ourselves – as insiders – that
we come up with a totally different reason as to why we want a different
nation when we are addressing the question to one another. Among other
factors, the questions of identity, sacrifice, cohabitation and sustainability
become of paramount importance in this kind of internal justification: Is
there such a thing as Eritrean identity? Is the cause worth the all sacrifice?
Is the nation created out of this sacrifice sustainable? Can we – Moslems
and Christians – live together to create a free, democratic and prosperous
Eritrea that would make it in postmodern 21st century?
Saleh is a prime example of those Eritreans who confuse external
justification for internal one. When responding to the question why the
armed struggle started, all he says is that the Ethiopians didn’t keep their
word; that they unilaterally abrogated the federation treaty, and so on. And
as responses go, this might be a sufficient answer when given to an
outsider (as in the example given above). His response is equivalent to
saying that Ethiopians deserve the armed struggle because they started it.
But the internal justification has to do with an entirely different question:
do the Eritrean people deserve the armed struggle? He misses the
whole point because it is not what we did to them with the armed struggle
that is at issue but what we did to ourselves. It is also important to
remember that when we ask such a question, it is always after having
factored in whatever Ethiopia did to us – be it in treaties it abrogated or in
atrocities it committed – and the “victory” that came out of the struggle.
And if, in the end, we find out that ghedli has had no justifiable cause at
all, then the loss would go beyond the question of proportions; for there
would be no worthy cause at all with which to compare the sacrifice and
hence becomes prohibitive and inexcusable.
(b) Economic vs identity sustainability
Saleh has this tendency to line up many of the failed states of Africa to
justify the economic viability of Eritrea. Leaving aside the fact that he sets
his bar too low, the issue of sustainability, as framed in my last article,
has nothing to do with economic viability. I have always believed that
those who argue that the nation doesn’t deserve independence because it
is economically unsustainable are wrong. If its economy is to be an issue,
it would only be so if, prior to such a failure, the state has already failed at
a deeper level – at cohabitation level, where identity becomes a primary
issue.
The issue of sustainability that I raised has to do with the great divide that
exists between Muslim and Christian Eritrea – a divide that has been so
recalcitrant that it has out-survived the British, Ethiopian and ghedli eras,
and now is set to out-survive the Isaias regime. And what is more, given
the divisive tactics of the Isaias regime and the radicalization of Islam in
the region, the gap has even gotten wider than at any time before in the
short history of this nation. In the process, these two population groups
have come to embrace two diametrically opposed visions of where the
nation should be heading to that it is very hard (if not impossible) to
reconcile. As the one looks to Islam and the Arab world for guidance,
inspiration, association and identity, the other looks to the West and
Habesha world. These visions are so conflicting with one another that it is
impossible to accommodate them without the one displacing the other.
Therefore, this divide, in its potentiality, is even deeper and more
recalcitrant than the divide that used to exist between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
If the Eritrean nation eventually fails to sustain itself, it will be because of
this ever-widening, potentially irreconcilable identity divide.
This problem goes at the root of Eritrean identity. The linchpin that
supposedly holds these two population groups is the Eritrean identity. But
put under scrutiny, no such univocal identity exists. Whenever they talk
about “Eritrea”, the two population groups have two different Eritreas in
mind. A national identity cannot be built on a grammatical
confluence only, where an acoustic or script (or graphic – as in a
map) confluence hides semantic ambiguity. At these moments, neither
the ear nor the eyes are to be trusted; instead, we have to use our head to
disambiguate things – something that has been lacking throughout the
revolutionary movement. [Sometimes I honestly believe that the whole
Eritrean question is based on a grammatical confusion.]
Saleh pretends that this problem doesn’t exist and, instead, attempts to
answer an easier question entirely made up in his own mind. Again, his
response is symptomatic of larger Eritrea, which does all it can to wish
the problem away rather than tackle it head on – to whatever logical end
that may take us.
(c) Determinate vs indeterminate qualities
Saleh, in his article “The Spark, the Fire and the Torch”, mentions seven
“virtues” or “qualities” that supposedly made the Eritrean revolution
unique in Africa – such as “it was purpose-driven”, “it prevailed”, “it was
fought according to conventions of war”, “it was not someone else’s
proxy war”, etc. You could clearly see his fascination as to HOW ghedli
was conducted, without bothering to tell us as to WHY it was needed in
the first place. In his last response, he laments that I unnecessarily visited
these issues twice. He could not understand that I was addressing them
from their indeterminate and determinate sides.
The reason why I was addressing these “virtues” twice was because I
was making two points that could only be dealt consecutively. First, I
was emphasizing that, absent a clear identification of ghedli’s justifiable
cause, these “virtues” are indeterminate in nature; that is, standing on their
own, nobody could tell whether they are desirable or not. The example I
gave was meant to elucidate on this phenomenon: just by looking at a man
running fast, nobody can determine what the man is doing as good or
bad, even as one admires the runner’s skill. One needs to know why he is
running prior to making a judgment on the nature of that “running”. And
second, I was making the point that even if we assume that ghedli had a
justifiable cause – for the sake of argument – thereby providing content
to the otherwise neutral “virtues”, it lacked the so-called qualities that
Saleh attributes to it. Unlike the former, the latter required a detailed look
at ghedli’s past.
Again, Saleh’s malady is symptomatic of the larger society’s ailment: the
public has always been fascinated by HOW (the process) ghedli was
conducted – the heroism, the selflessness, the victories, martyrdom, the
women warriors, self-reliance, the patriotic songs, biddho, tsin’at,
tewefayinet, bitsifrna, temokro mieda, etc – without having any clue as to
WHY (the goal) it was needed in the first place and where it was heading.
The masses were fascinated by ghedli’s running skill, only to find
out in the end that all along it had been running empty handed (as
in a fool’s errand) and that in its “victory” it had nothing to offer
them.
Now let me address the most important distinction that Saleh (and most
Eritreans) fail or refuse to see because it strikes at the core of the cause
for independence.
The master argument: reconcilable vs enduring differences
Eventually, Saleh does manage to stumble into the true cause of the
revolution (at least, the half part of it) although remaining totally oblivious
as to the unjustifiable nature of the reasons that he so proudly enumerates
(“De-Romanticizing Ghedli: Serving A Toxic Brew To The Young And
The Disillusioned”):
“First of all, half of Eritrea, the part that supported Andnet, actually
bought that argument. In fact, they didn’t even think they had to
‘struggle’ because, in their mind, Ethiopia was already free and ruled by a
benevolent and divinely-guided king. The other half (Ibrhaim
Sultan/Adulkadir Kebire at the UN and Woldeab Woldemariam in his
writings) argued that Ethiopia was more feudal, more primitive, less
industrialized, less developed, and less democratic than Eritrea and it
would slow down Eritrea’s progress.”
The development argument
Let me reiterate the reasons that the founding fathers of the Eritrean
revolution had for preferring separation from Ethiopia so that there would
be not the slightest bit of doubt in the mind of readers: that Ethiopia was
more feudal, more primitive, less industrialized, less developed, and
less democratic than Eritrea and it would slow down Eritrea’s
progress. If this is true – and I tend to agree with Saleh on this – the
revolution (and the nation it wanted to build) must have been founded on
one of the shallowest causes imaginable (an unstable ground indeed)! Here
is why:
If we are to take the founding fathers’ line of reasoning to its logical end,
then the following happens to be true: if Ethiopia had been less (or
equally) feudal, less (or equally) primitive, more (or equally) industrialized,
more (or equally) developed and more (or equally) democratic than
Eritrea, then the founding fathers would have never argued for separation.
In fact, if we look at Ethiopia now, not only has it caught up with us in
most of these criteria, it has even surpassed us in some. There is
absolutely no doubt that it is more democratic than us – whatever
shortcomings its democracy might have. It is more developed and more
industrialized; and given the pace of its growth, the gap might even get
wider and wider. And as for feudalism, it is something that would
eventually disappear as industrialization, urbanization, education and
development increases, all of which Ethiopia has been doing better than
us. And as for the more subjective criteria of primitivism, given the past
50 years of barbarity and the Khmer Rouge like regime that we have now,
we are the last people on earth to preach anyone on this subject matter.
If the above is true, let’s now push this line of reasoning to its logical
conclusion: had the founding fathers lived to see this day or, better yet,
had they had the foresight that this day would come, they would have
never clamored for independence.
What, indeed, is deadly wrong with the founding fathers’ master
argument? They confused achievable properties for intrinsic ones.
They thought that backwardness was in the nature of Ethiopians and
progress in the nature of Eritreans. But as the passage of time has shown
us, all the differences they mentioned were easily bridgeable
(surmountable, reconcilable, etc), especially since Eritrea was not that
far ahead in all these categories – despite the illusion of it. But more
relevantly, if this was to be seen as a race, both Eritrea and Ethiopia
were a few meters removed from the starting line, in a long journey
that has yet to be finished. That is to say, given the long march of
civilization they had to go through as beginners, the advantage the
Eritreans had and were so proud of was totally insignificant.
We can mention three main reasons why the advantage Eritreans believed
they had over Ethiopians was illusory in the first place: (a) There was no
long history of urbanization in Italian Eritrea. Asmara, as a city, came to
emerge in the last six years of Italian rule. Prior to that, for about 45 years
it had remained a sleepy colonial town. (b) And when it comes to the
urban areas, the natives were confined to the ghettos, performing the
lowest kind of jobs. (c) Unlike the British and French, the Italians didn’t
educate their colonial subjects; the maximum education that a native could
get was a fourth grade. (D) The sudden development growth of Eritrea
depended on Ethiopia – even in colonial era!
We Eritreans seem to totally miss that the Italians built Asmara not
with Eritrea but with Ethiopia in their mind – that it to say, even the
little advantage that we had would have been be inconceivable without
Ethiopia. For a very convincing argument on (d), look at Tekeste Negash’
s excellent article, “The dilemma of Eritrean identity and its future
trajectories”: the paradox that even though Eritreans believed Ethiopia was
holding them back while totally dependent on the Ethiopian market for that
growth is best exemplified in the rapid urbanization of Asmara in the last
six years of Italian rule; it was only when Italy decided to invade Ethiopia
that Asmara was suddenly transformed from a sleepy town to a city of
about 100,000; within those six years it grew seven fold. And in the 50’s
and 60’s, Asmara flourished mainly because of the unfettered access it
had to the Ethiopian market.
And now, the downward spiral that ghedli started (what I called “the
greatest interruption”) is being accelerated under the PFDJ. Yet, many
Eritreans still think they are more advanced. Why? Because they believe
that that civilizing aspect (whatever that is), despite all evidence to the
contrary, is intrinsic to themselves; that is, they don’t have to point at
anything outside themselves to prove that. As all forms of
fundamentalisms go, this too is founded not only on the most trivial
aspect of one’s imagined self but also on fallaciously making an absolute
and immutable “truth” out of it.
The religion argument
But I would like to give more substance to the founding fathers’ motive
for independence than the frivolous one Saleh mentions, especially on the
Muslim side – the other half of the master argument. According to Saleh,
it is the independence bloc that embraced the development argument,
which was overwhelmingly Muslim. [Mohammed Birhan Hagos begs to
differ, who believes that it is the Christians who argued along this fascist
lines.] That would indeed be odd since this group represented that part of
Eritrea that was less educated and less urbanized, and hence in no position
to argue along the line mentioned above. Even when it comes to
feudalism, it was no better than Kebessa or Ethiopia; after all, it was only
during the British occupation that the Shimagle/Tigre feudal structure that
prevailed in the Muslim area, one that bordered to a caste-system, that
came to be dismantled.
That doesn’t mean that the Muslim half of Eritrea didn’t argue along that
line though; it did. Besides believing in it, it latched on to this argument
precisely because it felt it was the only cause that could hold the two
halves together, as weak a link as that might have been. This argument
was eventually appropriated by urban Eritrea (populated mainly by
Christians) and became the basis for the nihilist foundation of Shaebia.
Muslim Eritrea, on the other hand, although still espousing this idea, had a
more potent and overriding reason – an internal justification – to seek for
separation.
On the Muslim side, it was primarily a religious grievance (buttressed by
pan-Arabism) that motivated the independence movement. The names of
the movements themselves say it all: the Muslim League and Rabita Al
Islamia. The main argument of the main players of the Muslim bloc such
as Sheikh Abdulkadir Kebire and Ibrahim Sultan was that they would fare
worse under Ethiopia because it didn’t threat its Muslims right.
Again, if we push this line of reasoning to its logical end, had Ethiopia
been treating its Moslem population fair (“fairness” defined according to
them) or, better yet, had it been an Islamic state, this grievance would
have never been raised, and with it, the question of independence. It is
hard for me to imagine the likes of Ibrahim Sultan and Abdelkadir Kebire
demanding independence under such favorable conditions.
If the above is true, what is paradoxical is that the implication of the
Moslem bloc’s stand was consistent with the Andnet bloc’s stand. If the
Moslem bloc’s fear was that it would not fare better than Christians
(which included Eritrean Christians) under Ethiopian union, then they
ought to have seen no problem with the Andent bloc’s stand, which –
according to them – was set to profit from such a union. This implicit
logical agreement though had to remain inarticulate because the Christians
were needed as partners in the movement for independence.
Ever since, this strategic alliance had come to unravel many times because
of its inherent internal contradictions. Jebha is a good example of an
organization that died as a result of the internal contradiction that these
logical and strategic demands imposed on it. And it this contradiction that
exists now in its most potent form: even though the two population
groups feel they need each other to keep Ethiopia at bay (strategic
alliance), they don’t see eye to eye when it comes to the kind of Eritrea
they want to build. [This has been made stark clear recently with the EDA
split exactly along the old lines of the Muslim-Christian divide.] The
problem is that no nation can be built on strategic alliance only.
From the above, the paradox that emerges as a result of confusing easily
reconcilable differences for irreconcilable ones and enduring differences
for easily reconcilable ones cannot be lost on us: while the founding
fathers (and most Eritreans) thought the development difference was
irreconcilable, they totally ignored the much deeper and more enduring
divide based on identity. To understand the severity of this divide, one has
to look at the layers it is made up of; it is a seven-decked divide that pits
the Muslim against the Christian, the lowlander against the highlander, the
pastoralist against the sedentary farmer, the Tigrigna against other ethnic
groups, Tigrigna against other languages (and Arabic) and the Arab world
against the Habesha world. The seventh layer has to do with the two
groups’ different historical trajectories that only came to meet in the last
century.
It is important to remember that neither the Christians nor the Muslims
were arguing along nationalist lines. No national identity can be built based
on an achievable property like development, and for that matter skin-deep
only. The moment the nation against which they want to define
themselves becomes equally or more developed, that distinguishing
identity evaporates. The second, although based on actual identity, the
nationhood that it demands is based on a strategic alliance that requires an
enemy to hold it together. But once denied of outside enemy, the alliance
collapses; and so does the nation.
Non-nationalist causes
If the two causes that ghedli was fighting for were non-nationalist at the
core, two critical questions that put the necessity of ghedli itself into
question arise:
- 1.How is it possible for a non-nationalist grievance to be
solved through a nationalist movement, albeit one that is
founded on that very grievance only?
The fact that both grievances still persist with us in their pernicious forms
after the armed struggle’s “goal” has been achieved (after “mission
accomplished”), and the Eritrean nation was born, tells us that the solution
doesn’t fit the problem.
- 1.Since both grievances were non-nationalist in nature, could
they have been solved through non-nationalist means – that
is, within proper Ethiopia?
We have seen that urban Eritrea’s (mainly Christian) development
grievance would have been met within proper Ethiopia. And when it
comes to the Muslim grievance, Saleh Ghadi tells us that under the
current Ethiopian government, the Muslims’ lot has “improved many fold”
(“More of Red Tears”). If he cannot say so in the case of the current
regime in Eritrea, does it mean that Muslim grievances could have been
better met within Ethiopia? For instance, if lowland Eritrea had gotten its
own Kilil (the dream of federalists), would that have done more to address
Muslim grievances than all the 50 years of ghedli insanity? After all, when
Dergh was flirting with such an idea, it was getting a good traction among
the lowlanders. Under such Kilil, most of the intractable problems that
currently haunt Eritrea – the land problem, the settlement problem, the
refugee problem, the language problem, the constitution problem, etc –
would have disappeared. It seems as if a larger breathing space than
claustrophobic Eritrea is needed to address all these issues; after all, there
are certain experiments that only larger nations could easily afford.
In our age, absolutism in its pernicious sense takes place when “truths”
are made out of transitory or trivial phenomena. It is the easiest and laziest
way of coping with the complex realty brought about by modernity.
When Eritreans tried to make an easily achievable attribute
intrinsic to their identity, it was an easy way of coping with the
modern world suddenly thrust upon them with the Italian
encounter. The problem is no such “truths” could be fixed permanently
without drastically altering the very context in which they find themselves
embedded. Instead of the “truths” conforming to reality on the ground,
the world has to be violently altered to fit those fixed “truths”. And it is
amidst this kind of drastic alterations that human tragedies of epic
proportion take place. The current tragedy in Eritrea is a good example
where the whole society had to undergo radical experimentation to fit
ghedli “truths” that Shaebia dragged all the way from Sahel.
The sad truth is that the Shaebia man was created to provide solidity to a
chimera of an Eritrean identity; that is, nationalism had to be imposed after
the fact. Realizing that no enduring identity could be built on easily
achievable properties or on strategic alliances only, it was felt a new
identity that would hold the country together had to be built from scratch
– of course, after demolishing all competing identities. This Frankenstein
creature came to be in order to supersede (and not reconcile) what were
thought to be irreconcilable parts of Eritrea. That is to say, most of the
current ills of the nation could be traced to the independence movement’s
attempt to create a cause ex nihilo, given that there was no prior cause
that justified its creation.
One doesn’t fight to create a national identity; one fights to keep an
identity one already has. The whole Eritrean tragedy comes as result
of reversing this natural order. Eritreans don’t realize that the
unity they have been fighting for is at the root of all their problems.
If there are “unionists” to be blamed for the Eritrean malaise, it
would be these unionists.
[But since Part III will deal with how the crisis in modernity shaped the
Eritrean movement of independence, I won’t explore it further here.]
Splitting Isaias into two
For Saleh, as for many others of his ilk, the only way ghedli could be
vindicated is if all the current ills of Eritrea are to be attributed to one man
only – Isaias. But there is a serious dilemma to be faced in such an
endeavor:
If Isaias is to be blamed for all the ills of the nation, does it mean that
PFDJ is blameless? But that would be absurd; for without the huge
apparatus of the PFDJ, that has it tentacles spread all over Eritrea and
beyond, Isaias wouldn’t survive even a day. But if the ghedli apologists
are to hold both accountable (as Saleh does, in spite of his rhetoric, “It is
only Isaias!”), then another problem arises: if they cannot hold Isaias and
PFDJ separate of one another, how is it possible for them to hold Isaias
and Shaebia separate of one another, since he has been at the helm of
leadership of both organizations since the day of their inception? Even if
Saleh is willing to go as far as attributing all the ills of ghedli to Isaias to
get out of this dilemma, thereby exculpating PFDJ also in the process,
that would be admitting that ghedli was in as much a mess as Eritrea is
now.
So what is to be done? Saleh comes up with an ingenious solution: why
not split Isaias into two, and blame only the Isaias-after-the-border-
crisis! This way ghedli will be vindicated without going to the absurd
length of separating Isaias from the organizations that he has been leading:
the bad-half of Isaias will remain attached to PFDJ and the good-
half of Isaias will remain attached to ghedli! Here then is a case of a
distinction being fabricated where no distinction is called for. How does
he do it?
According to Saleh, all the problems of Eritrea started when Isaias
became paranoid as a result of the border war (“You Might Be a Ghedli
Romantic if …”):
“A step back. Has Isaias always been a tyrant, a dictator of sorts or have
events pushed him in that direction? Is the person who gave his consent
not only to the constraints of constitutionalism but to a constitution which
imposes term limits on his presidency … the same as the one who
unilaterally, and without any formal explanation, postponed elections 7
years ago and is now saying the next elections are in 30-40 years? …
“Why is he so cruel to his own people?
“A couple of theories. Why did the frightened man continue to beat a dead
snake? Because he is terrified of snakes. Similarly, the cruelty that Isaias
shows to his own people can only be due to two reasons: he has lost his
bearings or he has lost his balls.”
Although he won’t dare say it loud and clear, Saleh is telling us that before
the border crisis Isaias was a full-blown democrat at heart, and ready to
implement the constitution. Regarding this, I once wrote (“The Collective
Insanity that is Killing a Nation”):
“… And now, belatedly, the ghedli-apologists have discovered that the
Isaias-before-independence was a democrat at heart and hence not to be
blamed either; for they know, again, they cannot do that without
blemishing ghedli in the process. So who actually is to be blamed for all
the horrors that the nation is undergoing? The seven year old paranoia
of Isaias – when ‘he has lost his bearings or he has lost his balls.’ … And
when he had his bearings and balls all intact? He was all for the
constitution (figure that out!) …”
Of course, Saleh’s magic wand, by which he tries to make all that
implicates ghedli disappear by splitting Isaias into two, is just that – one of
those magic shows where one uses the power of illusion to split a man
into two with a saw, but with the man coming out intact at the end of the
process. [I would rather believe in Mengs’ “The Thing” – it looks more
scientific to me.]
Family resemblances with other movements
Even as he believes that PFDJ too is to be blamed, Saleh still propagates
his “one man theory” for precautionary reasons:
“… It is unthinkable to them that one man of extraordinary skills (talent, if
you are an admirer) like Isaias Afwerki can wreak so much havoc and
destruction in a country of five million. Thus, it is concluded, it can’t be
him; so it must be somebody else---his colleagues, the revolution that
produced him, the society that raised him ...”
We are not talking about a revolution that produced one monster, but a
multitude of monsters, enablers, supporters, cheerleaders and
romanticizers – a whole culture of martyrdom. The fact that someone
comes at the top doesn’t mean that his look-alikes at the bottom have to
be exculpated. But even if we are to look at the relation between the
system and the leadership only, there is too consistent a connection to be
dismissed as coincidence.
It is not a coincidence that nations like the Soviet Union, China, North
Korea, Communist Romania and Khmer Rouge’s Cambodia all invariably
produced totalitarian leaders, and for that, monsters of epic proportion:
Joseph Stalin, Mao Tsetung, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, Pol Pot and
Nicolae Ceausescu respectively. It could only be something in the system
that keeps churning out one tyrant after another. Only a poor observer
would reverse this causal process. That doesn’t mean that the tyrants
were not responsible for much of the horror that took place in their
respective reigns. But to simply attribute all the problems to the leaders
would leave the question as to why such a system keeps invariably
producing such tyrants a riddle. And more importantly, the totalitarian
leader cannot inflict the kind of pain that he invariably does without the
totalitarian machine that such a system produces.
The same holds true with many liberation fronts, especially if they are of
the “ideological” type and have undergone too much violence in their past.
It doesn’t have necessarily to be of a particular ideology so far as it
comes in its “pure” form – be it in its fundamentalist, communist, fascist
or even nihilist sense. To mention three cases – the Taliban, the Khmer
Rouge and the Tamil Tigers. These three movements have done more
horror to their respective populations than what the “enemy” has done. So
is it with many liberation fronts in South America, which started with
leftist aspirations to fight for the downtrodden masses and ended up as
drug cartels. So is it with some African liberation movements, which
underwent similar degeneration. And so is it with Shaebia. As in the case
of the communist states mentioned above, the same question has to be
asked regarding these liberation fronts: what is it about the experience that
these liberation fronts undergo – be it in their ideological or armed struggle
sense – that turns them into monsters? This is especially true if that
violent experience happens to be long, bloody and large scale, as has been
in the case of Eritrea.
That doesn’t mean some liberation fronts should have never started. What
determine a revolution are the clarity and nature of its cause, its periodic
assessment on its sacrifice and progress and the nature and magnitude of
the “evil” that it is fighting against; all of which have been direly lacking in
the case of Eritrea. First, up to this day nobody can tells us the cause that
justifies what the people have gone through in the last 50 years or the
bleak future they face now. Second, given that the armed struggle lasted
for 30 years, there can be no excuse as to why the “liberators” failed to
reassess their mission. Saleh reminds us how the Eritrean people gave
Aman Andom a receptive ear – ready to reassess their stand. What he
forgot to add is that the fronts were dead set against his overtures. They
felt he was a threat to their very existence; predictably, they were more
worried about their existence than the welfare of the masses. And third,
one wonders whether Eritrea did fare worse than other provinces in
Ethiopia, even the Amhara ones – take Gojjam, for instance. Or if a
comparison is needed to gauge the “colonial” nature of Ethiopia, think of
the apartheid system in Zimbabwe and South Africa and the colonial
system in Angola and Mozambique (all of which had liberation
movements).
Family resemblances from within
Recreating the ghedli environment – and with it, the Shaebia man – has
been the obsession not only of Isaias but also of the Yikealo generation.
So all that we have to do is trace every problem that the nation is facing
now to its ghedli past to see the stark family resemblance between the
two. The evidence is so overwhelming and so straightforward that only a
starry eyed romantic like Saleh would miss it. Let me start with one man’
s testimony before I go to national service and other general similarities.
(a) One man’s testimony
A reader who announced himself as someone who was living around
Areza at that time emailed me the following in response to my latest article:
“In the 1980s, the EPLF had taken many underage kids including girls by
force. Many of the kids returned home, some ran to the cities, many went
to Tigray and others crossed the border to the Sudan. When parents were
not able to bring their kids back and hand them to the EPLF, their crops
were confiscated. This was during the worst famine of the 1980s.
Although the yield of the crops was too little due to the lack of rain, the
aim of this inhumane act was to kill the whole family unit by hunger.
Many families had no choice but to migrate to Tigray in search of food
but Tigray was equally a famine-stricken region during that time.”
And this kind of atrocity was not confined to the EPLF, as the following
quotation from the same person testifies:
“… As a child growing up in the vicinity of Areza, Seraye (during Jebha
time) I had seen enough of the cruelty of this organization. When it had
won the war against Kohain, it had confiscated thousands of their
livelihoods cattle and brought many of them to our village. The shepherds
of the village, including myself, had to take turns in looking after them
until they were all slaughtered one by one. When it won the war against
Dembelas, it did the same thing. I had seen the Raya Azebo POWs who
were captured by Jebha in the seventies perish of disease, hunger and the
few lucky ones who had survived were killed in cold blood during the
1978 retreat. I had seen many innocent Eritrean merchants (negado) been
arrested and tortured. I had seen people being hanged in Areza … accused
of spying for the Ethiopian regime without any proof …”
If we are wondering now why is it that parents are being penalized for the
“crimes” committed by their sons and daughters (army desertion or
conscription evasion) either through a hefty penalty of 50,000 Nakfa or
imprisonment; why is it that at the middle of famine peasants are being
confiscated of their harvest; why is it that a huge chunk of the national
service attendants is made up of underage; why is it that the young are
clamoring to get out of the nation; why is it that many are arrested,
tortured and executed with little or no evidence, all that we have to do is
look at one man’s brief testimony of his past encounters with ghedli.
(b) National service: recreating the mieda experience
National service has become the greatest scourge of the land primarily
because it is where Shaebia’s greatest experimentation to turn Eritrea into
Sahel is being conducted. Almost all the ills that afflict the nation can be
traced to this ill-conceived project, among which are bloody
confrontations with neighboring countries, mass exodus, perpetual
slavery, mass starvation, proliferation of prisons, killings and massacres,
parental penalization and sexual abuse of women. And the blue print for
this project comes out directly from ghedli’s past.
But if we are to specifically trace how this family resemblance between
mieda and national service came about, we have to look at its conceptual
beginnings. Incidentally, Saleh, in one of the ugliest moments of his
writing, accuses “The Young and the Disillusioned” – the disillusioned
Warsai – for having failed to appreciate the “virtues” of ghedli because
Shaebia, besides bringing them “liberation” in a silver platter, didn’t
sweeten this package by adding to it their education trust fund. Leaving
aside his arrogance and insensitivity, I like the fact that he couched it in
terms of “inheritance” since that is exactly what their ironically given
name denotes – “Warsai”.
The word “inheritor” triggers a positive connotation as someone who has
inherited a good legacy or material benefits. One wouldn’t call someone
who inherits a debt an inheritor. But the Warsai are meant to inherit the
worst: “the fruits of ghedli” – call them “the grapes of wrath”. Ghedli had
nothing to offer except its hardships, which it was more than willing to
recreate under the slightest pretext. This is what I wrote in “Identity
through ‘Equality by Subtraction’” regarding that Orwellian named
inheritance:
“Let me now couch the above mentioned irony in ‘appealing’ terms: the
Warsai are meant NOT to inherit the fruits of the struggle, but oddly
enough, the struggle itself; or rather all the hardships that the struggle
offers …
“What makes this undertaking [the national service] sinister is that the
Yikealo generation actually believes letting its younger generation go under
the same hardship experiences that they have undergone in the struggle
years is the best legacy they can leave behind. The fact that the CAUSE
that necessitated such a hardship doesn’t exist any more doesn’t bother
the Shaebia generation at all. For them, it is the PROCESS, with its
potential of reshaping the Warsai in the image of Shaebia, and not the
CAUSE, that matters. That is why recreating the ghedli environment,
wherein such an experimentation would be freely and excessively
conducted, became an obsession of this generation. The beginning of this
sinister task was Sawa, one that eventually culminated in the war with
Ethiopia. This war was not only willed into existence by Isaias, it was also
happily embraced by his generation for providing it the perfect context it
had been desperately seeking for to recreate the mieda experience into
which it wanted to initiate a whole new generation. The extended military
service which the Warsai have been subjected to for the last ten years is
not so much a military necessity as it is a conducive environment for this
sinister undertaking. Having triumphantly succeeded in recreating the
struggle era (minus its cause, of course), the Isaias generation can now
proudly point at all the ‘hard experiences’ they have let the Warsai inherit.”
Indeed, the direct family resemblance between ghedli and national service
is to be found in the ugly legacy that the latter is supposed to inherit from
the former – a cause for all the horror in Eritrea. An education trust fund,
my foot!
(c) Other family resemblances
For those who are not yet convinced of the family resemblance between
Shaebia and PFDJ, let me add some major policy similarities to what I
have said so far:
- Self reliance: This misguided policy that has brought havoc to the
economy of the nation has its roots in its immediate mieda
predecessor: bistifrina. This is the main cause for the forced labor
that has enslaved a whole generation, for the mass exodus that has
emptied towns and cities across Eritrea and for the mass starvation
that is going on right now in Eritrea. Recreating the ghedli years,
hundreds of thousands are being made to toil in the wilderness in
Sisyphean tasks while their families are living in utter destitution. - Temokro mieda: This one-fits-all-experience is at the root of all
incompetence that is the mark of the Isaias regime. Imagine a
minister presiding over fishery ministry at one time, health ministry
at another time and tourism ministry at yet another time. Only if
one thinks that temokro mieda is enough of an educational
experience to fit in any job (as Isaias claimed once) would this
foolish endeavor be ever attempted. And this is not confined to the
top; almost every incompetent job that one sees in all the
departments can be traced to temokro mieda. - Anti-intellectualism: The anti-intellectualism that has been
causing havoc to the educational system in Eritrea is the direct
result of the lethal anti-intellectualism that identified Shaebia from
its formative years when it started its witch-hunt against students,
in general, and university students, in particular. Throughout its
existence in mieda, it not only killed the entire intellectual climate, it
left no stones unturned to squash any kind of dissent, even of the
mildest type. - A culture of violence: All the confrontations that independent
Eritrea has been experiencing – within and without – are the direct
extension of Shaebia’s confrontational past. This is a nation that
went to war with all its neighbors – Yemen, Djibouti, Sudan and
Ethiopia – within seven years of its birth (all at a time when Isaias
was not yet paranoid – according to Saleh). And if we go back to
the mieda past, we won’t find even a single case where it resolved
a festering issue with a peaceful means, be it within itself –
Menqae, Yemin, Falul, etc – or without – Jebha, Ethiopia, etc. - Halewa sewra: the security apparatus that has spread its tentacles
all over Eritrea now is the exact replica of the Halewa Sewra of the
past. The culture of suspicion, lack of rule of law, intimidation,
detention, torture and killings that are going on now have been
perfected in mieda. After the border crisis, Shaebia changed its
gears to its coercive past without a glitch to retrieve all its
mechanism of terror, even to the minutest detail of the design of its
underground dungeons. - Intolerance to dissident: Those who make the distinction
between Shaebia and PFDJ mark the defining moment for this
distinction to be the squashing of the G-15 dissent. They forget
that what has remained invariant throughout its existence as
Shaebia/PFDJ is its ability to devour its dissenters – Menqae,
Yemin, Falul and now G-15. What they see as an exception is in
fact one instance of a well-established pattern.
Given the overwhelming evidence that is to be found at the surface level,
it is amazing to see the tenacity with which Saleh keeps repeating his
mantra: It is only Isaias! It is only Isaias!
Demonizing the Warsai generation
Saleh’s fuzzy logic is to be found in every paragraph that he has written.
It would require a book to address them line by line. Before I conclude
this article though, I would like to say a few words on a subject matter
that he is willing to compromise not only his logical but also moral
integrity: the demonizing of the Warsai generation, all for the sake ghedli.
Saleh believes that I have found a receptive audience among the young
and the disillusioned. Well, the first thing that we have to do is figure out
the population group so vulnerable as to be willing to swallow the “toxic
brew” that I keep concocting. I am sure that by this vulnerable young
generation, he doesn’t mean the YPFDG. The latter group are up to their
neck immersed in romanticizing ghedli and hence in tune with Saleh on
this critical point. So who could he be pointing his finger at? Well, the
only ones left are some of the Warsai generation in Diaspora who,
according to him, couldn’t make the distinction between the Isaias regime
and ghedli.
In order to make his point, he has to demonize them first: first, he dubs
them “Y&D”, hoping to categorically stigmatize them; second, he
infantilizes them (“the young”), even though most of this generation are in
their 30’s; third, he makes an unjustifiably disillusioned generation out of
them, ungrateful of the independence someone else brought them with so
much sacrifice; and, fourth, he derogatively labels them (“the Wall
Leaners”, among other insunuations).
But the Warsai is the last population group that ought to be accused of
having a wrong understanding of ghedli and its teghadelti because they
have been living it. Unlike those in Diaspora who are fighting for a
bankrupt idea from a distance, the Warsai have the most intimate
knowledge of what it is like to be under the terror of ghedli [many of
which I have mentioned before]. All the Warsai are asking is to be left
alone to live a normal life, as any other human beings in any part of this
planet would do. To a generation that has been living under unimaginable
horror, to say that they are brats who are disillusioned because Shaebia
didn’t put a trust fund for their education is to reach a height of
insensitivity I have never seen in Saleh before. How is this supposed to be
different from what Isaias has been saying regarding the starving masses:
that they are spoiled?
Is Saleh telling us that the Warsai are leaving their country in droves
because Shaebia didn’t put a trust fund for their education? If so, perhaps
a better comparison would be Ghidewon Abbay, who has been accusing
the Warsai generation of abandoning Eritrea for better life in the West. But
that would be odd, given what Saleh has to say in response to the
involuntary nature of ghedli that I described: “About the Jebha tegadelti
and their decision of what to do after they were pushed out to Sudan, he
leaves out one critical factor in their decision-making process: the
unprecedented generosity of the West and their willingness to accept to
exile any Eritrean who happened to be in Sudan at that time …” As usual,
he doesn’t seem to understand the implications of his statement on the
nature of ghedli. What does it say of those who supposedly chose life
over death but when given alternative suddenly chose America over
Eritrea – that they were fighting for lack of a better alternative in
their personal livelihoods? But if he would believe, like me, that neither
ghedli nor national service had any justifiable cause, then it makes sense to
abandon both of them for a better alternative. Much more so in the case
of Warsai, given the horror of an alternative they had been living under.
Saleh – as many other Eritreans of his ilk do – has developed a huge blind
spot for ghedli and, as a result, could only see what glitters. Even the title
of his article “The Spark, The Fire and the Torch” has all the promise of a
Las Vegas casino – all glitter and no substance. As seen from the above,
the logical flaw is as deep as it could possibly get. In each and every
instance, whether he is ignoring important distinctions or creating one, he
is always fascinated by the technical aspect – be it in the shot that started
it all (the spark); in how (as opposed to why) ghedli was conducted, albeit
falsely; in how the land was liberated, with no idea what to do with that
land once liberated. In all of them, he is reluctant to do some conceptual
digging.
It is painful to see an intelligent guy like Saleh Younis torturing himself,
going not only through logical but also moral contortions, all to vindicate
ghedli. Deep down, I believe that he realizes that if he is going to do what
he has got to do, he has to push logic to the sides. But what it lacks in
logic, he has to make it up somewhere else; hence the character
assassination, the demonizing of the Warsai generation and the naked
pandering to nationalists. To borrow the slogan of the pandered upon, I
want the original Saleh Younis back – one that was witty, intelligent and
honorable.
[I did promise before to post an article on the killings in Eritrea, with a
special emphasis on the Kunama massacre at Mai-Dima, but I have been
postponing it for obvious reasons. Since it is almost done, I will post it
next. After that will follow Part III of “Eritrean Independence: Is It Worth
All the Sacrifice”, where the Muslim-Christian divide, with their defensive
identities, will be explored extensively.]
Yosief Ghebrehiwet
07/16/09
ghyo71@hotmail.com
| All rights reserved. |
| Ethio Quest News Together We Can Make It! |
 | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  |
| Zersenay Tadese " He became the first person in Eritrean sporting history to win an Olympic medal.. More |
| Eritrea |
| Perpetuating Tyranny Under Mantel of Youth Festival "...Latest one out of such arsenals that tyrant Afawerki deploys in order to draw gullible youth to his indoctrination camp (aka Sawa) is the annual pilgrimage to SAWA" More |
| UN council warns Eritrea over Somalia insurgency Reuters UN USA - Remarks by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S...... "..But even now, it is not too late. The United States calls on the Government of Eritrea to seize this window of opportunity to change course..." More Fighting for Israel's African refugees By YAAKOV LAPPIN "Of the 17,000 refugees here, 8,000, the largest group, are Eritreans. The Eritrean military conscripts from the ages of 14 to 45. Soldiers don't have enough food to eat. Large numbers of young people flee." More A Response to Col. Dawit's Proposal by Free Bertukan Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Imperative to be Clearheaded in order to find our Way Forward by Hassan Umer Abdalla Ethiopia and Eritrea: Does Rational Politics Work? By Dessalegn Asfaw COLLABORATION WITH ERITREA IS BETRAYAL OF THE ETHIOPIAN NATION (PART I) By Tsegaye Kassa In Lieu of Eritrean & Ethiopian Ties by Amdemikael Mengisteab The way forward for Ethiopia and Eritrea by Dawit Woldegiorgis Eritrean Independence: Is It Worth All the Sacrifice? (1) by Yosief Ghebrehiwet The imperative for Ethiopians dealing with Eritrea By Neamin Zeleke Why Egypt Always Gets Her Way? Somaliland Press "... Another obstacle for Sheikh Sharif government is also AL-Shabab Group who has been armed by Egypt and Iran through Eritrea. This is also true that Sheikh Hassan Tahir and his supporters are getting help from Egypt through Eritrean channels...." More |
| Eritrea The Africans Focus Nile Politics Peace for Horn of Africa Eritrea Ghana Kenya Liberia Somalia South Africa Sudan Zimbabwe |
| Refugee voices: Looking for hope in Ethiopia (Relief Web) - "...I don't want to take any chances. They took our property before. How can we believe that they will give us nationality now? I fear..." More |
| Related Stories Distant dream of normal relation with Eritrea By Robele Ababya Why Not the Way Forward for the Horn Dear Col. Dawit Woldegiorgis? By Mellese Woldeselassie EPLF's "Eritreanism" in the post independence era by Mohammed Birhan Hagos Eritreans back to Ethiopia, why now? and why were they deported? By Ashanafi M |
| Eritrean Independence: Is It Worth All the Sacrifice? (1) by Yosief Ghebrehiwet |
