AS ETHIO-EGYPTIAN ACCORD TAKES EFFECT,
AL AHRAM RUBS SALT ON OLD WOUNDS
12 January, 2009 | By Genet Mersha
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As any prudent person would, I value pragmatism, especially if it
promotes mutual benefits and facilitates common search for solutions
to difficulties in inter-state relations. In that regard, official
pronouncements by the prime ministers of Ethiopia and Egypt at the
year’s end have somewhat conveyed that very impression about their
budding relations. Its outcome is the singing of a memorandum of
understanding on 31 December at Addis Ababa, fostering a consultative
mechanism whose scope and seriousness probably makes it the first of
its kind between the two countries.
Ahram, Jan 7-13 issue, courtesy of www.nazret.com [1]). It
encouraged me to at the new bonfire within the context of the needs
and realities of the two countries. Nevertheless, more troubling for me
is Mr. Nikrumah’s interpretation of ‘compromise’ and ‘pragmatism’
that has bedecked his entire article. On a minor point, he has chosen to
lump them together in such a way that he makes them sound as if they
were two interchangeable concepts.
However, real life has taught me, and I must say I easily recognise
compromise and pragmatism when I see them. Their texture is distinct,
although they are capable of interlacing with shared convictions
between two parties. I am not so certain, if “Eyeing Abyssinia: Egypt
stakes out a special place in Ethiopia”, reflects that understanding. I
acknowledge the article rather for its crisp delivery of the writer’s pride
in his country’s diplomatic finesse in a manner that it harks back to the
ill-fated Egyptian efforts through the centuries to ensure its control of
the source of the River Nile.
In the light of the foregoing, it is befitting to ask whether the content of
the latest understanding between the two countries is as the officials
say. Alternatively, as an anterior to Egyptian foreign Ministry, is Al
Ahram under instruction to spin the story as a diplomatic coup for
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazief. Or, is there something that has not yet
been made public? Alternatively, is Al Ahram encouraged to interpret
the agreement through the prism of the existing and the unyielding
Egyptian policy interests mapped out by Kedhive Isamail (1862-1879)?
To what end? If the whole purpose of the article is to calm down
domestic concerns, it does not show that Egypt is prepared to honour
its part of the deal. If that were the case, it would have chosen to
prepare its people for a sense of fairness and equity in sharing the Nile
waters.
It would be dishonest of me to say, I am optimistic at this point; nor am
I against their agreement. That is because I understand perfectly
Ethiopia’s limitations. However, what I cannot understand is why
interpretation of the new agreement on the part of the Egyptians is still
characterised as an exchange between water rights and investments and
technology related cooperation. Incidentally, it is not only the Egyptians
that are seen on that mistaken path this time around. Ethiopian officials
have done little to speak out in response and in the deportment the
Egyptian minister of water works, as mentioned here down
somewhere, has made clear his unchanging position.. Instead, our
officials thronged to place on the Egyptian plate their respective wish
list.
Official pronouncements on the agreement
In spite of the ease of his persona, Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif seemed
to go out of his way at the press conference to emphasise repeatedly
that his visit to Ethiopia primarily is “to enhance trade and investment
ties between the two countries.” As it happens, 120 businesspersons
accompanied him, notably their size a quarter more than the 90-member
trade delegation that visited the country last October. True by the sign
of things, this time around Egypt appears determined to put its money
where its mouth is.
At the state level, it has kicked of with a ‘sovereign wealth’ sort of
investment by the National Bank of Egypt that has now become the first
central bank owning a 20,000-hectare farmland in Afar region. In
addition, private investors have envisioned a number of projects and
investments that ranged from construction in Amhara region, possible
establishment of five pharmaceutical companies, to manufacturing
enterprises and an industrial zone in Oromia. I would not be surprised if
the Egyptian bank should quietly spread the scope of its activities in a
country where the law prohibits foreign banks from carrying out
banking operations.
Otherwise, so far so good, so long as Ethiopia does not slump under
the weight of economic dependence on Egypt and succumb to political
arm-twisting that this usually entails. For now, at least, the Nile water
quota was not ‘officially’ on the agenda of discussions or negotiations.
If news sources are accurate in their reporting, Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi freely broached the topic seemingly to reassure his powerful
guest of Ethiopia’s keenness and good faith in seeking solutions to the
sharing of Nile river water fairly. In that connection, he stressed
Ethiopia’s “readiness to address the issue of the Nile on the basis of a
win-win result for the mutual benefit of all the peoples and countries of
the Nile Basin” (Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release).
Someone gave me the sense that he was at pains to stress to sceptics
“it would be a huge mistake to choose not to engage Egypt on other
matters until the Nile question is resolved” (Reporter), although the
media reporting that did not testify to that. Therefore, his approach, as
implied by the press release and the reporting media, is presumed to be
to use this agreement as a bridge to address the equitable sharing of the
Nile waters in future. Shall we say, it is confidence-building measures,
even though I am not entirely certain to whose confidence it refers?
Al Ahram’s interpretation of the agreement
The light speed with which the relations between Ethiopia and Egypt are
being calibrated and the building blocks are set in process has made the
whole thing seem like a torrent, a thing that has surprised Gamal
Nikrumah. However, he is less than candid in his assertion, in
attributing the whole thing to Ethiopia’s ‘compromise’ and
‘pragmatism’, as mentioned above. He writes, “The Ethiopian
compromise, publicly acknowledging Egypt’s right to its quota of Nile
water, is an answer so obvious that one wonders why it was not on the
table already. Now that it is, Ethiopia’s pragmatism may produce better
results.” It is not clear whether this reflects ignorance of history or is
blindly one-sided, a shortcoming that has made his whole effort look
like deviously antithetical to fairness and justice.
Furthermore, Mr. Nikrumah tries to give credence to his view by
stating, “Ethiopia has no intention of circumventing the will of Egypt by
building the new dams [the three dams agreed upon at the Nile Basin
Initiative (NBI)]. Instead, Ethiopian officials explained that they wish to
interest Egyptian investors into putting their money into such ventures.
Egyptian officials readily resolved to accede to Ethiopia’s wishes albeit
conditionally.”
The key here is what Egypt’s Minister of Irrigation Mohamed Allam has
said. He was clear about the mission and mandate of his office under
the new agreement. Mr. Gamal Nikrumah quotes him confidently
asserting, “We have agreed to the offer as long as it doesn’t affect
Egypt’s Nile water quota.”
Recall in this connection, the rapprochement between Ethiopia and The
Sudan egged on Egypt into a trilateral undertaking between the three
countries. The then Egyptian Minister of Water Resources Mohammed
Abu Zeid on June 29, 2004 for the first time ever declared publicly¸ ”
Ethiopia has the right to build dams”, into which The Sudan chipped in
similar support (ENA, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt reach agreement on Nile
River projects). This created huge optimism about the direction of Ethio-
Egyptian relations, the euphoria of which was no less than the present.
Not surprisingly, Mr. Abu Zeid was relieved of his post sometime later,
judged as poor negotiator (www.enafrik.com). Even then, when he
was in office for the greater part of the ten-year life NBI, 39 articles
have been agreed, according to Ethiopian sources, although the
negotiations remain stalled over a single subparagraph, 14 (b), the one
that deals with the water-sharing proposal to which Egypt and The
Sudan are mortally opposed. As a new minister, Mr, Allam seems keen
to keep his job, whose constant flights to the capitals of the upper
riparian states has got him the nickname ‘the lobbyist.’
Therefore, it should not come as a surprise the ‘Ethiopian
pragmatism/compromise’ Gamal Nikrumah refers to give rise to two
questions. First, what is that an uttered compromise? Secondly, what
does Ethiopia get in return, if the alleged compromise is in reference to
the three medium-sized dams, which have already been agreed upon at
the NBI forum? The answer probably lies in what different Ethiopian
officials are expecting from Egypt, as Mr. Nikrumah’s article seems to
suggerst. These are: (a) Prime Minister Meles says, “We have moved
from mutual distrust to friendly economic cooperation.” (b) Ethiopian
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Tefera Derebew solicits,
“We are confident that Egypt is willing and capable of supplying
Ethiopia with much needed appropriate technology for sustainable
development.” (c) Ethiopia’s Minister of Trade and Industry Girma
Birru says Egypt would participate in the construction of an industrial
zone.
Can Ethiopia truly benefit from this agreement?
There is no doubt that cooperation with other countries is beneficial, so
long as our country knows where its interests lie and promotes them to
its benefit in every possible way. This requires fine-tuning laws and
regulations, preparing institutions to challenging responsibilities with the
rising number of foreign companies and business activities. There must
be the political will to fight both official and ordinary corruption. The
manifest characteristic of pragmatism in form and substance is its belief
in the need to gauge regularly the benefits of projects undertaken jointly
with other governments and economic cooperation with foreign
companies and their investments. The mere rise of the scale of
investments is not necessarily a plus on its own, or effective for
national development unless overtime it makes dent on unemployment,
income generation, capacity building and transfer of technology.
In the case of Egypt, their diverse involvement requires greater
diversification and improved production on the part of Ethiopia to
increase its exports to Egyptian markets without, which the current
planned level of Egyptian investments would hugely tilt the balance of
trade in favour of Egypt. Already, as it stands now trade volume has
reached $100 million. Available data indicate that in 2008, Egypt has
exported to Ethiopia over $80 million, while Ethiopia’s export is a
skimpy $13.4 million. The nine months figures for 2009 indicate further
deterioration in that regard.
Another problem is transportation of goods, as the country’s exports
are likely to increase because of the massive lands that have been rented
out to foreign countries and governments. Although the Ethiopian
government claims the products would satisfy domestic markets first,
this is simply untrue. First, the objective of those huge farms is for
markets in the home countries, the rest of which would seek foreign
markets. This is a function of better prices on one side and the weak
purchasing power of Ethiopians on the other. Secondly, the increased
volume of exports imposes huge burden on local transportation of
goods and to and from the ports of Djibouti and The Sudan, perhaps
Berbera too. It is not clear whether government has mapped out
strategy and producers so that local producers would not be
discriminated against systematically in use of transport and port
arrangements.
There is no doubt, by dictates of circumstances we have become a
nation of sceptics. It follows that this is also one of those things that
have to be judged in the coming months and years by how much the
Ethiopian government would give priority to the country’s longstanding
interests, benefits and privileges of its people. I recall writing about our
country’s foreign policy that stoops low to those that come with a ‘fist
fool of dollars’, especially citing the case of the Saudi Arabian embassy
at Addis Ababa that demanded property owned by two of our decorated
athletes to be transferred to it and got it. There have been several
painful moments in our country’s history, when our national interests
failed to be the guiding post and citizens are first-class relative to
foreigners.
Another problem is joint venture has taken a different meaning in
Ethiopia. A foreign company claims it is a joint venture, but there is no
evidence that to show the identity of its partners. This is very common
practice among Chinese companies in developing countries. For
instance, Norinco-Lalibela Engineering & Construction Share Company
(NORI-LA) claims it is an international share company, established in
accordance with the commercial code of Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia. That is quite all right. Then it discloses its joint venture
agreement was made on April 7, 2004 between Chinese and Ethiopian
enterprises with a total capital of about $34 million. When one browses
its webpage, it does not their partners. It is a normal practice to say
who their joint venture partners are, but not in this case. I raise this
example because it is important to see and understand how foreign
companies operate in the country and whether the country derives the
benefits, it is entitled to.
Finally, I must state that an inherent problem in Ethiopia’s policies,
domestic or external, is the question of balance. Often emotions flare
with a short fuse, creating problems of inconsistency. Growing
relations with Egypt requires a careful balancing act, a quality in short
supply. Closer ties should not curtail Ethiopia’s freedom of action, as
that would affect its relations with the rest of Africa. They are many
and their networks extensive. For instance, if one takes our side of the
region, the other upper riparian states and the East and Southern
African economic initiatives under the AU are one to bear in mind. It
should not also alter the political cohesion that over the years has
evolved within IGAD, where those upper riparian member states have
maintained through the years beneficial relations with Ethiopia.
On Al Ahram’s insensitivity
As I come to the end of this article, I must register my strong
resentment against the tone of Mr. Gamal Nikrumah’s kicker, “Eyeing
Abyssinia.” Even to a disinterested reader, its yearning for a return to
an ignominious era is glaring. Perhaps what its author has made evident
is Egypt’s undying desire to keep alive Egypt’s goal of controlling the
River Nile, with or without Ethiopia.
He must be aware though that Ethiopia has not accepted the 1902 treaty
with colonial Britain. Nor has it been agreeable with the 1959 agreement
between Egypt and the Sudan, setting out water use quota among them,
without contributing a bucket of it. If Al Ahram’s thinking, as reflected
in the title of Mr. Nikrumah’s article “Egypt stakes out a special place
in Ethiopia” is anchored on the Nile question, nothing has changed for
Ethiopia that would make her overlook those two treaties/agreements.
By the terms of the 1959 treaty, annually the River Nile doles out to
Egypt 55.5 billion cubic meters of water—representing 87 percent of
the Nile’s flow—and 18.5 billion cubic meters to The Sudan. In
contrast, Ethiopia uses less than one percent of it, of course, about
which we cannot put the entire blame on Egypt and The Sudan, as our
underdevelopment has played part. Nonetheless, the case for sharing
equitably with Ethiopia should have been evident to him as a respected
journalist.
In fact, Mr. Nikrumah insinuates as though Ethiopia has said, “take
whatever you want, but make sure you cooperate with me in the
economic field. Even then, the best he could is to state, “Egypt, too,
[compared with Israel] stands poised to prove that it can offer technical
assistance to Ethiopia. Though no small challenge, it is one that can be
met.”
Nonetheless, referring to the visit by Minister for International
Cooperation Faiza Abul- Naga, he expresses his worries that it would be
costly for Egypt.
Courtesy
AL AHRAM RUBS SALT ON OLD WOUNDS
12 January, 2009 | By Genet Mersha
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As any prudent person would, I value pragmatism, especially if it
promotes mutual benefits and facilitates common search for solutions
to difficulties in inter-state relations. In that regard, official
pronouncements by the prime ministers of Ethiopia and Egypt at the
year’s end have somewhat conveyed that very impression about their
budding relations. Its outcome is the singing of a memorandum of
understanding on 31 December at Addis Ababa, fostering a consultative
mechanism whose scope and seriousness probably makes it the first of
its kind between the two countries.
- Usually the dark side of
diplomacy is that what is
unsaid publicly has far
reaching implications more
than what is reported in the
media, be it bilateral visits or
agreements singed as
groundbreaking venture. That
is what I felt, after reading
Gamal Nikrumah’s piece
Ahram, Jan 7-13 issue, courtesy of www.nazret.com [1]). It
encouraged me to at the new bonfire within the context of the needs
and realities of the two countries. Nevertheless, more troubling for me
is Mr. Nikrumah’s interpretation of ‘compromise’ and ‘pragmatism’
that has bedecked his entire article. On a minor point, he has chosen to
lump them together in such a way that he makes them sound as if they
were two interchangeable concepts.
However, real life has taught me, and I must say I easily recognise
compromise and pragmatism when I see them. Their texture is distinct,
although they are capable of interlacing with shared convictions
between two parties. I am not so certain, if “Eyeing Abyssinia: Egypt
stakes out a special place in Ethiopia”, reflects that understanding. I
acknowledge the article rather for its crisp delivery of the writer’s pride
in his country’s diplomatic finesse in a manner that it harks back to the
ill-fated Egyptian efforts through the centuries to ensure its control of
the source of the River Nile.
In the light of the foregoing, it is befitting to ask whether the content of
the latest understanding between the two countries is as the officials
say. Alternatively, as an anterior to Egyptian foreign Ministry, is Al
Ahram under instruction to spin the story as a diplomatic coup for
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazief. Or, is there something that has not yet
been made public? Alternatively, is Al Ahram encouraged to interpret
the agreement through the prism of the existing and the unyielding
Egyptian policy interests mapped out by Kedhive Isamail (1862-1879)?
To what end? If the whole purpose of the article is to calm down
domestic concerns, it does not show that Egypt is prepared to honour
its part of the deal. If that were the case, it would have chosen to
prepare its people for a sense of fairness and equity in sharing the Nile
waters.
It would be dishonest of me to say, I am optimistic at this point; nor am
I against their agreement. That is because I understand perfectly
Ethiopia’s limitations. However, what I cannot understand is why
interpretation of the new agreement on the part of the Egyptians is still
characterised as an exchange between water rights and investments and
technology related cooperation. Incidentally, it is not only the Egyptians
that are seen on that mistaken path this time around. Ethiopian officials
have done little to speak out in response and in the deportment the
Egyptian minister of water works, as mentioned here down
somewhere, has made clear his unchanging position.. Instead, our
officials thronged to place on the Egyptian plate their respective wish
list.
Official pronouncements on the agreement
In spite of the ease of his persona, Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif seemed
to go out of his way at the press conference to emphasise repeatedly
that his visit to Ethiopia primarily is “to enhance trade and investment
ties between the two countries.” As it happens, 120 businesspersons
accompanied him, notably their size a quarter more than the 90-member
trade delegation that visited the country last October. True by the sign
of things, this time around Egypt appears determined to put its money
where its mouth is.
At the state level, it has kicked of with a ‘sovereign wealth’ sort of
investment by the National Bank of Egypt that has now become the first
central bank owning a 20,000-hectare farmland in Afar region. In
addition, private investors have envisioned a number of projects and
investments that ranged from construction in Amhara region, possible
establishment of five pharmaceutical companies, to manufacturing
enterprises and an industrial zone in Oromia. I would not be surprised if
the Egyptian bank should quietly spread the scope of its activities in a
country where the law prohibits foreign banks from carrying out
banking operations.
Otherwise, so far so good, so long as Ethiopia does not slump under
the weight of economic dependence on Egypt and succumb to political
arm-twisting that this usually entails. For now, at least, the Nile water
quota was not ‘officially’ on the agenda of discussions or negotiations.
If news sources are accurate in their reporting, Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi freely broached the topic seemingly to reassure his powerful
guest of Ethiopia’s keenness and good faith in seeking solutions to the
sharing of Nile river water fairly. In that connection, he stressed
Ethiopia’s “readiness to address the issue of the Nile on the basis of a
win-win result for the mutual benefit of all the peoples and countries of
the Nile Basin” (Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release).
Someone gave me the sense that he was at pains to stress to sceptics
“it would be a huge mistake to choose not to engage Egypt on other
matters until the Nile question is resolved” (Reporter), although the
media reporting that did not testify to that. Therefore, his approach, as
implied by the press release and the reporting media, is presumed to be
to use this agreement as a bridge to address the equitable sharing of the
Nile waters in future. Shall we say, it is confidence-building measures,
even though I am not entirely certain to whose confidence it refers?
Al Ahram’s interpretation of the agreement
The light speed with which the relations between Ethiopia and Egypt are
being calibrated and the building blocks are set in process has made the
whole thing seem like a torrent, a thing that has surprised Gamal
Nikrumah. However, he is less than candid in his assertion, in
attributing the whole thing to Ethiopia’s ‘compromise’ and
‘pragmatism’, as mentioned above. He writes, “The Ethiopian
compromise, publicly acknowledging Egypt’s right to its quota of Nile
water, is an answer so obvious that one wonders why it was not on the
table already. Now that it is, Ethiopia’s pragmatism may produce better
results.” It is not clear whether this reflects ignorance of history or is
blindly one-sided, a shortcoming that has made his whole effort look
like deviously antithetical to fairness and justice.
Furthermore, Mr. Nikrumah tries to give credence to his view by
stating, “Ethiopia has no intention of circumventing the will of Egypt by
building the new dams [the three dams agreed upon at the Nile Basin
Initiative (NBI)]. Instead, Ethiopian officials explained that they wish to
interest Egyptian investors into putting their money into such ventures.
Egyptian officials readily resolved to accede to Ethiopia’s wishes albeit
conditionally.”
The key here is what Egypt’s Minister of Irrigation Mohamed Allam has
said. He was clear about the mission and mandate of his office under
the new agreement. Mr. Gamal Nikrumah quotes him confidently
asserting, “We have agreed to the offer as long as it doesn’t affect
Egypt’s Nile water quota.”
Recall in this connection, the rapprochement between Ethiopia and The
Sudan egged on Egypt into a trilateral undertaking between the three
countries. The then Egyptian Minister of Water Resources Mohammed
Abu Zeid on June 29, 2004 for the first time ever declared publicly¸ ”
Ethiopia has the right to build dams”, into which The Sudan chipped in
similar support (ENA, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt reach agreement on Nile
River projects). This created huge optimism about the direction of Ethio-
Egyptian relations, the euphoria of which was no less than the present.
Not surprisingly, Mr. Abu Zeid was relieved of his post sometime later,
judged as poor negotiator (www.enafrik.com). Even then, when he
was in office for the greater part of the ten-year life NBI, 39 articles
have been agreed, according to Ethiopian sources, although the
negotiations remain stalled over a single subparagraph, 14 (b), the one
that deals with the water-sharing proposal to which Egypt and The
Sudan are mortally opposed. As a new minister, Mr, Allam seems keen
to keep his job, whose constant flights to the capitals of the upper
riparian states has got him the nickname ‘the lobbyist.’
Therefore, it should not come as a surprise the ‘Ethiopian
pragmatism/compromise’ Gamal Nikrumah refers to give rise to two
questions. First, what is that an uttered compromise? Secondly, what
does Ethiopia get in return, if the alleged compromise is in reference to
the three medium-sized dams, which have already been agreed upon at
the NBI forum? The answer probably lies in what different Ethiopian
officials are expecting from Egypt, as Mr. Nikrumah’s article seems to
suggerst. These are: (a) Prime Minister Meles says, “We have moved
from mutual distrust to friendly economic cooperation.” (b) Ethiopian
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Tefera Derebew solicits,
“We are confident that Egypt is willing and capable of supplying
Ethiopia with much needed appropriate technology for sustainable
development.” (c) Ethiopia’s Minister of Trade and Industry Girma
Birru says Egypt would participate in the construction of an industrial
zone.
Can Ethiopia truly benefit from this agreement?
There is no doubt that cooperation with other countries is beneficial, so
long as our country knows where its interests lie and promotes them to
its benefit in every possible way. This requires fine-tuning laws and
regulations, preparing institutions to challenging responsibilities with the
rising number of foreign companies and business activities. There must
be the political will to fight both official and ordinary corruption. The
manifest characteristic of pragmatism in form and substance is its belief
in the need to gauge regularly the benefits of projects undertaken jointly
with other governments and economic cooperation with foreign
companies and their investments. The mere rise of the scale of
investments is not necessarily a plus on its own, or effective for
national development unless overtime it makes dent on unemployment,
income generation, capacity building and transfer of technology.
In the case of Egypt, their diverse involvement requires greater
diversification and improved production on the part of Ethiopia to
increase its exports to Egyptian markets without, which the current
planned level of Egyptian investments would hugely tilt the balance of
trade in favour of Egypt. Already, as it stands now trade volume has
reached $100 million. Available data indicate that in 2008, Egypt has
exported to Ethiopia over $80 million, while Ethiopia’s export is a
skimpy $13.4 million. The nine months figures for 2009 indicate further
deterioration in that regard.
Another problem is transportation of goods, as the country’s exports
are likely to increase because of the massive lands that have been rented
out to foreign countries and governments. Although the Ethiopian
government claims the products would satisfy domestic markets first,
this is simply untrue. First, the objective of those huge farms is for
markets in the home countries, the rest of which would seek foreign
markets. This is a function of better prices on one side and the weak
purchasing power of Ethiopians on the other. Secondly, the increased
volume of exports imposes huge burden on local transportation of
goods and to and from the ports of Djibouti and The Sudan, perhaps
Berbera too. It is not clear whether government has mapped out
strategy and producers so that local producers would not be
discriminated against systematically in use of transport and port
arrangements.
There is no doubt, by dictates of circumstances we have become a
nation of sceptics. It follows that this is also one of those things that
have to be judged in the coming months and years by how much the
Ethiopian government would give priority to the country’s longstanding
interests, benefits and privileges of its people. I recall writing about our
country’s foreign policy that stoops low to those that come with a ‘fist
fool of dollars’, especially citing the case of the Saudi Arabian embassy
at Addis Ababa that demanded property owned by two of our decorated
athletes to be transferred to it and got it. There have been several
painful moments in our country’s history, when our national interests
failed to be the guiding post and citizens are first-class relative to
foreigners.
Another problem is joint venture has taken a different meaning in
Ethiopia. A foreign company claims it is a joint venture, but there is no
evidence that to show the identity of its partners. This is very common
practice among Chinese companies in developing countries. For
instance, Norinco-Lalibela Engineering & Construction Share Company
(NORI-LA) claims it is an international share company, established in
accordance with the commercial code of Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia. That is quite all right. Then it discloses its joint venture
agreement was made on April 7, 2004 between Chinese and Ethiopian
enterprises with a total capital of about $34 million. When one browses
its webpage, it does not their partners. It is a normal practice to say
who their joint venture partners are, but not in this case. I raise this
example because it is important to see and understand how foreign
companies operate in the country and whether the country derives the
benefits, it is entitled to.
Finally, I must state that an inherent problem in Ethiopia’s policies,
domestic or external, is the question of balance. Often emotions flare
with a short fuse, creating problems of inconsistency. Growing
relations with Egypt requires a careful balancing act, a quality in short
supply. Closer ties should not curtail Ethiopia’s freedom of action, as
that would affect its relations with the rest of Africa. They are many
and their networks extensive. For instance, if one takes our side of the
region, the other upper riparian states and the East and Southern
African economic initiatives under the AU are one to bear in mind. It
should not also alter the political cohesion that over the years has
evolved within IGAD, where those upper riparian member states have
maintained through the years beneficial relations with Ethiopia.
On Al Ahram’s insensitivity
As I come to the end of this article, I must register my strong
resentment against the tone of Mr. Gamal Nikrumah’s kicker, “Eyeing
Abyssinia.” Even to a disinterested reader, its yearning for a return to
an ignominious era is glaring. Perhaps what its author has made evident
is Egypt’s undying desire to keep alive Egypt’s goal of controlling the
River Nile, with or without Ethiopia.
He must be aware though that Ethiopia has not accepted the 1902 treaty
with colonial Britain. Nor has it been agreeable with the 1959 agreement
between Egypt and the Sudan, setting out water use quota among them,
without contributing a bucket of it. If Al Ahram’s thinking, as reflected
in the title of Mr. Nikrumah’s article “Egypt stakes out a special place
in Ethiopia” is anchored on the Nile question, nothing has changed for
Ethiopia that would make her overlook those two treaties/agreements.
By the terms of the 1959 treaty, annually the River Nile doles out to
Egypt 55.5 billion cubic meters of water—representing 87 percent of
the Nile’s flow—and 18.5 billion cubic meters to The Sudan. In
contrast, Ethiopia uses less than one percent of it, of course, about
which we cannot put the entire blame on Egypt and The Sudan, as our
underdevelopment has played part. Nonetheless, the case for sharing
equitably with Ethiopia should have been evident to him as a respected
journalist.
In fact, Mr. Nikrumah insinuates as though Ethiopia has said, “take
whatever you want, but make sure you cooperate with me in the
economic field. Even then, the best he could is to state, “Egypt, too,
[compared with Israel] stands poised to prove that it can offer technical
assistance to Ethiopia. Though no small challenge, it is one that can be
met.”
Nonetheless, referring to the visit by Minister for International
Cooperation Faiza Abul- Naga, he expresses his worries that it would be
costly for Egypt.
Courtesy
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| Nile Politics The Africans Focus Peace for Horn of Africa Terror in Horn of Africa Congo Eritrea Ghana Kenya Liberia Somalia South Africa Sudan Uganda Zimbabwe |
| A Quest For Unity |
| "...The African Union (AU) is an organisation made up of 53 African states." More |
| Ethiopia's History of National Resistance for African Unity & Dignity PART - ONE PART - TWO PART - THREE |
| The Enduring Food Crisis and Legal Politics of the Nile. "While the annual inundations of 'our river' presented the foundation of one of the most stable and structured eco-political society of human history in the lower most reaches and..More |
| NILE (Wikipedia) " The Abbai portion of the river is considered holy by many in Ethiopia, and is believed to be the Gihon river mentioned as flowing out of the Garden of Eden in Genesis 2.[1] The Abay portion of the Blue Nile rises at Lake Tana and flows for some thirty kilometers before plunging over the Tis Issat Falls.. More |
| Previous Stories Signs of conflict emerge over the Nile's waters Paul Goldsmith Ethiopians seek review to old treaty on Nile water Tesfa-alem Tekle Egypt Controls Most of Nile's Water Newsweek Courting the Nile Goddess Ayenew Haileselassie Differences 'Narrowing' Over Nile Waters Adam Morrow and Khaled Moussa Al-Om Egypt media accuses Israel of zooming in on its water sources By Zvi Bar'el Donors back Egypt, Sudan on Nile water pact By Malingha Doya Nile Basin: Egyptian Minister Says Accusations Against Eritrea Not True Capital Eritrea Nile negotiators are near a deal By Matt Bradley A growing thirst for the Nile By Yolande Knell Ethiopian Minister revists sensitive Nile water share issue By Desalegn Sisay |
| Eyeing Abyssinia By Gamal Nkrumah Ethiopia-Egypt accords, a danger to Nile Basin negotiations? By Desalegn Sisay ETHIOPIAN PM SALES RELATIONS WITH EGYPT HAVE CHANGES FROM DISTRUST TO FRIENDLY Brunei Struggle over The River Nile; what should be Sudan's strategy? Professor Ali Abdalla ALI Treasure of the Nubians on the Nile By Julie Robinson Egypt denies blocking Nile Basin agreement by Ramadhan Rajab Nile Basin states seek ‘collective’ negotiations By MATHIAS RINGA |
| Ethio Quest News: For latest Ethiopian News, views, Reviews and More |
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