Will popular rebellions spread south of the Sahara?

Will popular rebellions spread south of the Sahara?

22 March, 2011 | By William Gumede
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Many an African dictator is

trembling in his (invariably

dictators appear to be

mostly men) boots,

following popular uprisings

that swept long-time rulers

out of power in Tunisia and

Egypt.

Libyan people are rebelling against their ruler, Colonel Muammar
Gaddafi – and he is fighting back violently. Gaddafi has ruled since
1969 when he took power in a coup, making him Africa’s longest
ruler.

Meanwhile, Zimbabwe’s ruling Zanu PF has prohibited state owned
media from reporting the full extent of the Maghreb uprisings –
presumably lest its own people get ideas from the citizen of Tunisia
and Egypt. Robert Mugabe’s government charged 45 students,
trade unionists and activists with treason, accusing them of watching
news videos of the uprising in Egypt and plotting to topple
Zimbabwe's autocratic president.

But will the domino effect of these popular uprisings also sweep
dictators out of power further south? ??Zimbabwe, Swaziland,
Lesotho and other Sub-Saharan African countries are also ruled by
long-time autocrats and their people are suffering as hard – if not
harder – than those in Tunisia and Egypt.

In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe has been in power since 1980. In
Cameroon Paul Biya has been in the saddle for 29 years. Yoweri
Museveni has presided over Uganda since 1986. Jose dos Santos
has been in power since 1979, and is preparing to stand for another
term – while, incredibly, grooming one of his children to take over.
The list goes on.

There are some parallels, but also some clear differences, between
societies in the north, and those South of the Sahara.

The first parallel is that both the Maghreb countries and those South
of the Sahara have allowed – in the words of South African Finance
Minister Pravin Gordhan, ‘inequality to grow, allow(ed) joblessness
to accelerate (and is) about state(s) that doesn’t actually perform
(and is) about a minority that accumulates things for itself’.

ECONOMIC CRISIS, ELITES AND UPRISING

All African countries are about to feel the delayed effect of the
global financial crisis, just as Tunisia and Egypt had. Typically in
countries, like Swaziland, Lesotho or Cameroon, leaders pride
themselves on the fact that they have supposedly not been so
harshly affected by the recent global financial crisis. However, they
are mistaken – the true effects are yet to be felt.

But many of those countries depend heavily on Western aid. With
the austerity in most of the major donor countries, this aid may either
dry up, or trickle into a drip. Even the budgets of international
organisations and NGOs heavily active in development projects in
these countries have been cut or will be reduced.

In some African countries more than 50 per cent of the national
budget comes from foreign aid. Combined with a perceptible rise in
the prices of basic food and living costs in most African countries,
ordinary African people are having it tough.

Desperation is easily turned into the political outrage. Just last year,
high bread prices caused violent riots in Maputo, Mozambique.
With day-to-day living expected to become even worse, such riots
may this year turn into full-blown uprisings against the ruling elites.

Like in Tunisia and Egypt, there is a deep gulf between the relatively
small ruling elite, living a ‘bling’ and elite lifestyle, and a majority of
the poor – a potent grievance, a festering sore if one happens to be
the unfortunate poor individual.

The effect of the global financial crisis has also hit the relatively small
middle classes in countries south of the Sahara, just as it also hit the
Tunisian and Egyptian middle classes. In Tunisia and Egypt the
middle classes were also starting to feel the pinch of difficult
economic circumstances.

Generally in these regimes, the middle classes are locked into the
system, and often have much too loose opposing it. The
combination of squeezed middle classes, the usually long-suffering
poor working classes and the unemployed and underemployed
youth are a potential explosive cocktail – also in the countries south
of the Sahara.

YOUTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT

The demography of all African countries has changed so
dramatically since independence, so much so that young people now
make up most of their populations, whether the country is south, or
north of the Sahara. Young people were at the vanguard of the
uprisings in both Tunisia and Egypt.

Furthermore, young African people – those unemployed - now have
generally higher levels of education, although in most cases, not with
the kind of technical skills African economies now desperately need,
compared to a generation ago.

Globalisation and new technological advances, such as the internet,
social media, such as twitter, have meant that many people in
Tunisia and Egypt, including the youth can see how better-off their
peers in Western countries live, compared to them.

MEDIA FREEDOM AND CONTROL

In most African countries most of the media is in state hands, so
ruling parties can ensure news about official corruption,
mismanagement or wrongdoing is kept out of the public domain.

Private media, where present, often does not have a wide reach.
Furthermore, such private media is often also financially vulnerable.
The state in many African countries still directly controls most of the
economy – whether in North Africa or Africa south of the Sahara.

And if they don’t, they have indirect influence, through their ability to
restrict private companies trading licenses, and so on, should they
refuse to toe government lines.

This means in most African countries the state is still the biggest
advertiser. If they are not, they can influence the private sector not
to advertise in print, broadcast or electronic media they perceived to
be critical of government – or risk losing government contracts or
operating licenses.

Radio is the largest medium in Africa, including South Africa, but it
is often controlled by governments. In many cases, independent FM
radio is frequently only given licenses if they do not cover political
issues.

Although community radio is increasingly proliferating across the
continent, they often also have the same restrictions – or they just
refrain from covering politics to stay on the good side of
governments.

The news blackout in most African countries means that leaders and
political movements can stay in power for longer without many of
their supporters in the far-flung rural areas knowing the extent to
which these leaders abuse their powers.

This is why the likes of Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe can get away
with blaming his government’s own bad governance on the work of
Western ‘imperialists’, former colonial powers, minorities or
opposition groups supposedly linked to them.

A flourishing private and independent media that conveys
information to citizens about the corrupt activities of leaders and
ruling parties, which is not conveyed to them by official media, plays
a crucial role in informing citizens of what is really happening in their
name.

Not surprisingly, ‘people power’, the phenomenon where African
citizens finally kick out bad governments that have ruled for far too
long, often always coincides with the growth of private independent
media– that can provide citizens (especially ordinary members of
these parties) with the real story – and a growing civil and
opposition movement, that can offer an alternative.

THE ROLE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES

The rise of the internet, social media, the mobile phone, has meant
there are now alternative means of communication outside that of
the state-owned media.

In the uprisings against unpopular governments in Tunisia and Egypt,
new social media, that can circumvent the official media, and the rise
of independent media, such as Al Jazeera, has done the trick also.

Although the internet is not as widespread in many African countries
south of the Sahara compared to Egypt or Tunisia, the power of the
worldwide web is still potent.

In Zimbabwe’s last elections, people used mobile phones to text
witnessed attempts at vote rigging by ZANU (PF) (Mugabe’s party)
strongmen at voting stations in remote areas. This meant that
opposition groups, international observers and independent media
could be informed more quickly than during previous elections.

Mobile phones are more promising among poorer Africans. This
presents potential for the internet if most of these mobile phones can
be made internet capable. Furthermore, the potential to bringing
news via the mobile phone is an attractive option for Africa.

So if a revolution is unlikely to arrive in most African countries south
of the Sahara via the internet, it may arrive via the mobile phone.

CURBS ON MIGRATION

In Egypt and Tunisia many young people and professionals in the
past could migrate across the Mediterranean to Europe to seek
better prospects. However, economic difficulties in most of Europe
have meant that these countries blocked entry barriers for the young
from Africa – the phenomenon of ‘fortress’ Europe.

It is also now more difficult for young Africans to seek greener
pastures in Europe or the US. Of course countries neighbouring
South Africa, such as Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, also have
the option of exporting many of their young to relatively richer South
Africa.

Yet, South Africa itself has felt the brunt of the global financial crisis
– all this after leaders initially claimed the country rode the storm.
Last year more than one million people lost their jobs. In spite of all
the talk by politicians that they will create millions of jobs this year:
looking at their plans it becomes quickly clear this is half-baked and
mere wishful thinking.

The opposite appear more likely; more people will lose their jobs
this year. South Africa is also now tightening entry barriers for those
looking for jobs from neighbouring countries. This will force the
unemployed young at home – where they could become a potent
force for change.

PLAYING THE ELECTIONS GAME

One big difference between Egypt and Tunisia compared to other
African countries south of the Sahara, is that there are more
incidents of staged elections in the latter which on regular occasions
give the masses an outlet for their frustrations. The recent
presidential and parliamentary elections held in Uganda springs to
mind.

Furthermore, the opposition parties in these countries are so
irrelevant – little alternative policies, and generally clones of the
ruling parties and each other (the opposition political parties in
Nigeria are a good example); they are more of a stumbling bloc to
genuine democracy than anything else.

In the Ivory Coast presidential election that took place last
November strongman Laurent Gbagbo lost against Alassane
Quattara, but still insists he won. Whoever finally becomes
president, there is very little, if any, differences between their policy
platforms or even the outlook of the two – so it will in real terms be
more of the same.

Most of Africa’s dictators are of course being propped by Western
giants or the new Eastern powers, such as China, in exchange for
oil, minerals or for strategic geopolitical reasons – Kenya is a good
example.

Zimbabwe recently stated that China’s Development Bank will
pump in up to US$10 billion of investment in the country’s mining
and agriculture sector, a big boost for Mugabe political survival.

Over the past few years, Tunisia’s supposed economic ‘miracle’ –
in spite of political autocracy - was toasted by multilateral
organisations and Western powers. Egypt was a strategic focus for
the US and the regime there was flush with foreign aid.

Even Libya joined the US-led ‘war of terror’ and became an ally of
Western powers – which shored up Gaddafi’s powers ahead of the
recent rebellion against his rule by ordinary citizens of Libya.

It is instructive when US President Barack Obama pulled the plug
on Egypt the regime caved in. Many African countries south of the
Sahara have in the past either like Swaziland, kept on the right side
of the US, by claiming they are partners in the ‘fight against terror’,
or have been kept in power, by financial support from China (who
needs their minerals), as is the case of Zimbabwe, or South Africa
(in Zimbabwe because of historical ties as a fellow liberation
movement).

Long-time strongmen Yoweri Museveni in Uganda and Meles
Zenawi of Ethiopia have been the darlings of the West, in spite of
their autocratic behaviour. Recently Ethiopian economists and
scholars wrote an open letter to Nobel Prize winning economist
Joseph Stiglitz, who is close to Meles Zenawi, to distance himself
from the autocrat.

Most African regimes – whether north or south of the Sahara – have
been in power because the army has been loyal to them. These
regimes have generally showered the army with largesse to keep
them onside. With difficult economic times ahead it will prove
increasingly hard to keep feeding these armies.

Furthermore, in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia once it became
clear, to the army, that the regimes had lost the support of powerful
overseas backers, they changed allegiances, or at least remained
neutral.

In countries south of the Sahara, the army still remains a formidable
obstacle. That is why in countries, like Zimbabwe, in order to bring
about change, the army may have to be bought off, or at least given
enough incentives, for example amnesty and job security, to remain
neutral.

UNITY IN DIVERSITY

Tunisia and Egypt are countries that are relatively ethnically
homogenous. Except for perhaps, Swaziland and Lesotho, most
countries south of the Sahara are ethnically diverse.

More importantly, in most of these countries unscrupulous political
leaders and parties have played off different ethnic groups against
each other to remain in power, or did so on the back of the most
dominant ethnic group, or by forming ethnic alliances.

This means that in many African south of the Sahara countries,
people often perceived their problems in the context of the fact that
they are in the ‘wrong’ ethnic group, rather than blaming it on their
bad leaders or governments, no matter the ethnicity. Nigeria,
Zimbabwe and Kenya are cases in point.

LIBERATION AND THE LIBERATED

Finally, in some African countries south of the Sahara, parties of
liberation and independence are still in power. Many supporters
vote for them mostly on the credentials they acquired as a result of
their struggles for independence.

The youth in many countries south of the Sahara, where liberation or
independence movements are still in power, are often mobilised by
youth wings of these ruling movements. The youth leagues are often
allowed to be more radical by the founding liberation and
independence movements, in order to periodically disperse popular
anger among the youth.

A good case is the ANC Youth League, and its leader Julius
Malema or Zimbabwe’s ZANU (PF), Mozambique’s Frelimo or
Angola’s MPLA youth wings.

In African countries ruled by independence/liberation movements,
the number of youth participating in civil movements outside these
leagues is small – though not insignificant.

Youth, like their senior activist predecessors, may protest against
incumbent liberation/independence movement now in governments,
but still see these movements as the parties of liberation and
independence.

Angry youth in such cases are not demanding for these
liberation/independence movement governments to be removed, but
for them to improve the way they govern – or to allow them to share
the spoils of government also.

As the demography of most African countries is increasingly
becoming younger, these credentials independence/struggle
credentials are wearing thin. This changing demographic means
many young people have little if any memory of yesterday’s
liberation struggle.

And very soon, young voters will have no recollection of the anti-
apartheid or the anti-colonial struggle, and may not simply vote for
ruling parties because of their historical liberation movement record.
This may herald the kind of youth-led rebellions seen in Tunisia,
Egypt and Libya.

Revolution south of the Sahara may not come immediately, but it is
certainly on its way.?--?

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* William Gumede is senior associate and programme director,
Africa Asia Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies
(SOAS), University of London. His forthcoming book, The
Democracy Gap, Africa’s Wasted Years, is released in 2011.

Courtesy